WAR MEMOIRS OF DAVID LLOYD GEORGE 1917

CAMPAIGN OF THE MUD: PASSCHENDAELE 351
tion of the French military leaders that the Haig plan was
doomed to fail. In fact, the document was clearly prepared
in concert with the British Staff to influence the War Committee
to go forward with the plan of G.H.Q. for a great
campaign in the North without regard to the change in essential
conditions. It was subtly contrived to tell us enough
to justify a strong offensive by the British Army without
revealing any of the facts that might lead us to turn down
the Flanders scheme.
How came it that this eminent soldier, who was specially
charged with the duty of acquiring all intelligence as
to French movements, opinions and conditions which had a
bearing on the conduct of the War by Britain, should have
deemed it compatible with his highly responsible position to
withhold from the Government on the eve of an important
decision by them, vital information that had actually been
imparted to him as the liaison officer of the British Army?
The story of the preparation of the memorandum which he
submitted to the War Committee is told by his own biographer.
On his way to England, Wilson was invited to stay at
G.H.Q. at Blondecques, Haig's headquarters. Before he went
there he "felt misgivings" and "was somewhat troubled as
to the possible issue of the contest." Haig, however, seems
to have soothed his anxious spirit. Wilson says:
"He was most nice to me, begged me to do something
with my 'great brains', and said that there was always a bed
and a welcome at his headquarters for me."
Wilson then hinted that he was on the lookout for employment.
Haig answered that:
"He knew it well, that he trusted me absolutely, and
that I had been invaluable to him and so on. So we parted."
This was from Haig who, as all knew, distrusted Wilson
through and through.