WAR MEMOIRS OF DAVID LLOYD GEORGE 1917

382 WAR MEMOIRS OF DAVID LLOYD GEORGE
succeed. When the Germans were almost equal in numbers
and superior in artillery to the combined forces of the British
and French, an offensive by one of them alone was doomed
to failure. On this point the following facts were concealed:
1. Ministers were told confidentially that the offensive
was urged upon us in the first instance by the French as
the only means of saving France from collapse, just as pressmen
were subsequently informed in confidence that its continuation
was attributable to French entreaties that we
should keep on fighting. We were not informed that, so far
from urging us on, the leading French Generals had done
their best to dissuade us, and had stated emphatically that
they condemned the project and thought it a foolish venture,
which must fail. They also made it clear that the greatest
service we could render to them would be to take over more
of their line. They had conveyed these opinions to Sir Douglas
Haig and Sir William Robertson. These eminent Generals,
in stating their case for the scheme, had concealed
these important facts from the Government.
2. The salient facts as to the condition of the French
Army and the extent of the demoralisation in its ranks were
also withheld or minimised. We were not told that the
French plan was to wait for the Americans and meanwhile
to increase their equipment, husband the Allied resources
and only engage in limited operations not involving heavy
casualties, but perhaps also to help the Italians in their
offensive. Headquarters having determined in their own
minds that the French were inventing or exaggerating their
mutinies to shirk responsibility for action, they felt it would
be undesirable to confuse and distract our innocent minds by
repeating to us such canards.
3. We were not informed that the new Commander-in-
Chief of the French Army, and some of his leading generals,
favoured a combined attack on the Italian Front. Had we