WAR MEMOIRS OF DAVID LLOYD GEORGE 1917

508 WAR MEMOIRS OF DAVID LLOYD GEORGE
the full support of the British Army. Even with it he failed.
Without it, he could not even have tried. But an active and
zealous initiative on the part of the Italians was a condition
precedent to any such change in the strategy of the year. This
was not forthcoming. Why? Cadorna had agreed to the
Chantilly plans, and he felt he could not go back on them
without a breach of faith with his professional comrades. The
coolness with which he received the proposal of a combined
offensive on the Italian Front was not attributable to strategical
doubt. It was prompted by his deference to professional
etiquette. Robertson rubbed it into him. He collared him
before he ever entered the Conference room and told him he
could not go back on his bargain and sell his brother officers
to the politicians for his own advantage. Cadorna was a man
of sensitive honour. It was a cruel choice — between his bond
and his country. Where such gigantic issues were at stake,
he ought to have resigned rather than sacrifice the chance
offered not only to Italy, but to the Alliance, of achieving
a victory which might have led to an honourable peace and
saved millions of lives. There was no real dishonour involved
in a change of plans. The circumstances were changed completely
by the change in the attitude of the British Government
and by their offer of material support for an Italian
offensive.
Looking back on the events of 1917, I ought to have
foreseen that a change of strategy was impossible without a
thorough change in our military leadership. With Robertson
and Haig, both men of an abnormally stubborn character,
remaining in the commanding position they held, a new policy
was not attainable. No policy can be worked effectively
through reluctant instruments. A general direction may be
given, but the entire machinery by which it is to be carried
out is in hostile hands. Between direction and execution there
is endless scope for manipulating details in a way which