WAR MEMOIRS OF DAVID LLOYD GEORGE 1917

THE STRUGGLE WITH THE TURK 91
there was a strong feeling that he would be one of the
most suitable selections for the Chief Command of the
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.
On the other hand, the War Cabinet were aware that
there was a growing opinion in favour of the retention of
General Smuts in a central position in this country, with a
view to the utilisation of his great qualities in the higher
conduct of the War.
General Smuts was a standing disproof of the theory
tenaciously held by the British War Office (despite the classic
example of Oliver Cromwell to the contrary) that no one was
competent to hold high military command without long
training in the regular army.
The career of General Smuts furnishes a practical demonstration
of the absurdity. He was a lawyer by profession.
But in the Boer War he was able with untrained troops to
hold at bay for years the best military brains that our War
Office could find to put against him, with the resources of
the Empire behind them. In British East Africa he showed
himself a brilliantly efficient, resourceful and energetic
Commander-in-Chief of our forces. Had he consented to take
in hand the Palestine campaign, I have not the least doubt
that it would, under his charge, have been one of our most
successful efforts.
The Imperial War Cabinet concluded its meetings on
May 2nd. As I have already related, I had asked General
Smuts to stay on for a time in this country, as I felt he was
too useful a man to be let go. Arising out of our Cabinet discussion,
I asked him if he would undertake the High Command
in Palestine. He asked for time in which to consider
the matter, but eventually on May 30th, he wrote to me declining
the post. His own account of this incident is as follows:
The Prime Minister was immensely interested in this war
front. He was strongly under the impression that Palestine might