WAR MEMOIRS OF DAVID LLOYD GEORGE 1917

SUMMARY AND RESULTS OF 1917 CAMPAIGN 573
Jerusalem meant more to hundreds of millions — Christian
and Mussulman alike — than Ostend. The calling of the
Turkish bluff was not only the beginning of the cracking-up
of that military impostorship which the incompetence of
our war direction had permitted to intimidate us for years;
it was itself a real contribution to ultimate victory. The encouragement
it gave to the Allies at a moment of depression
was useful, but the decided blow it gave to German prestige
amongst their confederates was of still greater service. It was
the first time the Germans exposed to their Allies their utter
inability to give them effective aid in defeat when they were
at last intelligently and resolutely attacked, and to protect
them from impending disaster. It made a definite impression
on the Turkish mind, and it was not without its influence on
Bulgaria — probably also on Austria.
Field Marshal von Hindenburg in his autobiography
bears out the impression which the loss of Baghdad made
both in Germany and amongst her Allies. He says:
The loss of Baghdad was painful to us, and as we well believed,
still more for all thinking Turkey. How often had the
name of the old city of the Caliphs been mentioned in Germany
in previous years. . . . We had guaranteed the Turkish Government
its territorial integrity of the Empire, and we felt that, in
spite of the generous interpretation of this contract, our political
account was heavily overdrawn by this new great loss.
So much for the charge that the British Government
were wasting our resources on useless side shows. No wonder
Hindenburg, in discussing the weakness of the military position
of the Turkish Empire beyond the Taurus, and our failure
to take advantage of it says:
If ever there was a prospect of a brilliant strategic feat, it was
here. . . . Why did England never make use of her opportu-