WAR MEMOIRS OF DAVID LLOYD GEORGE 1917

THE UNITED FRONT 531
"The people moreover are beginning to be sceptical of
the Americans winning the War."
Then comes the inevitable conclusion:
"For the above and many other reasons, it seems to
me most unwise to weaken our efforts on the Western
Front."
As to any idea of a campaign in Palestine, he had never
been able to regard it as a sound military measure:
The right military course to pursue is to act on the defensive
in Palestine and the East generally, and to continue to seek a
decision in the West. ... It entails, of course, that all resources
should be sent to the West Front, other than those which are
absolutely required for the defence of our Eastern positions.
He is very suspicious about the idea of Unity of Command:
"The principle of 'Unity of Command' and 'one front'
must be cautiously applied. In theory it is attractive, in
practice it has not been encouraging."
He insists that we should give the Allies a strong military
lead. Here he follows Sir Douglas Haig's hint. Unity of
Command must mean that the Commandment must be ours.
He then ends with the demand that there should be more
men, and he has left us in no doubt that they are wanted to
continue the offensive on the one and only front where the
altars were adequate to the immensity of the sacrifice.
In order to enlighten the Cabinet on the military position
and to test and fortify my own judgment on the action which
I was inclined to take, I decided to seek independent expert
opinion. I saw that Robertson, if he had views independent
of Haig's opinions, was stubbornly bent on keeping them to
himself, and that he would do nothing to stop throwing our
men into the Flemish shambles until Haig was ready to give
up. Of that there was no hope until the winter set in. Haig
was constitutionally incapable of changing plans he had once