WAR MEMOIRS OF DAVID LLOYD GEORGE 1917

468 WAR MEMOIRS OF DAVID LLOYD GEORGE
tria. But Robertson said that this must wait on Passchendaele.
In practical experience of fighting under modern
conditions, Robertson did not approach these three men.
But he beat them all in a rigid and unreasoning stubbornness
that was not open to argument or persuasion. He flourished
the Chantilly agreement in their faces and held them to
their bond, which was just as binding but more comprehensive
than that of Shylock, for it included the spilling of
blood. To all the appeals of Cadorna and the calm reasoning
of Petain, he had but one answer:
"I'll have my bond; I will not hear thee speak:
I'll have my bond; And therefore speak no more. . . ."
His sole concern was for the Flanders offensive to which
he had committed himself. He was not there to confer or to
consider. He went there to say "The Bond." He said it,
and stuck to it, and got it. As long as he was C.I.G.S. we
could not send anyone else to represent us at an Inter-Allied
Military Conference — except Sir Douglas Haig. That
would not have improved matters. His thoughts also were
fixed on what he was assured would be the crowning victory
of the War.
We had therefore either to proceed with the Ostend
operation or to dismiss both Robertson and Haig and appoint
generals who were not so committed. The Cabinet
were not prepared for so sensational a change. I have already
dealt candidly with the reasons. The guns had already opened
fire on the slopes of Passchendaele and in a few days the
infantry would advance to attack the German trenches.
The first assault achieved a measure of success which, if it
did not vindicate the project, at any rate did not justify its
immediate abandonment. The first check came when we
made our next efforts to break through. Early in August it
became more and more evident that the great break-through
to the coast could not be accomplished, certainly not without