WAR MEMOIRS OF DAVID LLOYD GEORGE 1917

396 WAR MEMOIRS OF DAVID LLOYD GEORGE
matters over and begged him carefully to weigh the points
which I had put. Personally, I said, even if my colleagues
agreed, I would not be willing to impose my strategical
views on my military advisers, but I had felt that I would not
be doing my duty if I concealed my great misgivings about
the advice they had given. If, after full reflection, they advised
against the suggestions I had propounded I would,
nevertheless, support them. I felt, however, that we were at
the parting of the ways. / believed that one course would
lead to victory and the other course to a hopeless and costly
struggle bringing us no nearer victory.
Sir W. Robertson said that the first note he had made
had been to ask to have time to prepare his reply. He and
Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig both fully appreciated the
great responsibility which lay on me. He agreed that this
might be the greatest decision in the War, and he wished to
say that neither he nor Sir Douglas Haig resented any of my
criticisms or suggestions. He would do his best to answer the
questions, but he pointed out to the Committee that an
officer of forty-one years' soldiering is bound to base his
views partly on military experience and instinct and knowledge
of the service, and similar considerations which it was
difficult to formulate briefly in writing.
After the conclusion of the meeting I instructed the
Secretary to ask Sir William Robertson and Sir Douglas
Haig to consider the desirability of examining the Italian
proposition on the spot in consultation with General
Cadorna.
It is, of course, a matter of history that our military advisers,
in face of this appeal from me, still decided to adhere
to their view as to the feasibility of the Flanders offensive.
Could I have gone behind these exalted Commanders and
conducted independent investigations on the spot into the