WAR MEMOIRS OF DAVID LLOYD GEORGE 1917

THE BATTLE OF CAMBRAI 445
in the British Army on the subject of training soldiers. He
gives an illustration from his knowledge:
The writer of this note is acquainted with one corps which
during the past twelve months happened to have 30 divisions in
it. Of these 30 divisions two were splendidly trained, a dozen were
trying to train and the remainder had little, if any, definite system
of training at all. They had, instead, a dozen excellent reasons
for explaining why they remained untrained. The corps commander
concerned had no opportunity to insist upon improved
methods of training, because the divisions were not in his corps
for a sufficient time for him to get to know them or report upon
them. All he gathered from one year's experience was a rough
idea that about half the divisions were untrained and the other
half were semi-trained.
The reason was obvious. The exigencies of these repeated
offensives did not give any commander the necessary opportunity
for giving the requisite training to men under his
command. Every division in its turn was thrown into the
trenches. When it came back behind the lines it was exhausted,
depleted, having probably lost its most experienced
officers and N.C.O.'s. Out of the sixty-four British divisions
in France, fifty-seven were thrown into the Flanders fight.
What chance was there for any commander to train his men?
The report was a complete justification of General
Petain's policy of limited offensives and preparations for the
campaign of 1918. But what a condemnation of the strategy
of the fatuous campaign of the Flanders coast!