WAR MEMOIRS OF DAVID LLOYD GEORGE 1917

28 WAR MEMOIRS OF DAVID LLOYD GEORGE
tern based on the spirit of offensive, a militia system essentially
non-provocative, and based on the idea of defence.
Against this it was argued that it was extremely difficult
to get rid of the professional element altogether, and that
the conditions of different countries differed so widely that
it would in practice be impossible to find a system on which
everybody could be agreed. Moreover, the greatest existing
guarantee of peace — the British Navy — was undoubtedly
a highly professionalised institution, and it would be impossible
to ask for a general reduction of military efficiency
on land without raising the question of naval disarmament.
It was, indeed, suggested by General Smuts that if the European
Powers by agreement debarred themselves from spending
money on their land defence they would have much more
to spend on big navies.
Mr. Henderson considered that Lord Milner's Committee,
in framing paragraph Number 6 of their report, while
they had excluded complete disarmament as a counsel of
perfection, were quite prepared to consider any reasonable
means for reducing armaments and preventing the recurrence
of war. Personally, he held very strong views on the subject
of disarmament, but was convinced that it. was necessary
first of all to see what result could be achieved in the direction
of a League of Nations. The policy with regard to disarmament
would have to depend on the nature of the international
relations set up after the conclusion of peace.
Mr. Chamberlain confessed to feeling that any attempt
to lay down restrictions on armaments was bound to give rise
to opportunities for fraud. Public opinion in this country
would insist that any British Government should be bound,
both in the letter and in the spirit, by the restrictions. In a
country such as Germany, public opinion would be entirely
in favour of the restrictions being tacitly broken or evaded.
He considered, however, that the suggestion contained in