WAR MEMOIRS OF DAVID LLOYD GEORGE 1917

APPENDIX I 583
he not defeat Austria but he himself would need support.
7. So much for the prospect of Austria being defeated.
As regards our postion, if the 75 batteries were sent we must
necessarily pass to the defensive for all practical purposes, 1
and be prepared to suffer losses similar to those suffered by
the Germans while on the defensive this summer. Also, we
abandon all hope of making either our air or sea situation
more secure so far as the Belgian coast is concerned, and,
in fact, the Germans might conquer us by an attempt to take
Dunkirk, and if they succeeded the situation would become
even worse than it is now. I do not say that they would succeed,
as this would depend to some extent upon the reinforcements
that Germany might be able to bring over from
the Russian Front and upon the power of her artillery.
This power has not been great recently, and as the number
of heavy guns she has on the Western Front are approximately
equal to the Allies, her failure must be due to other
reasons — for instance, the declining morale, inferiority in
the air, inefficient employment of the guns, or want of ammunition.
I do not pretend to say which; it may be a combination
of all. But as a shortage of ammunition has been alleged
I would point out that if left to her own devices Germany
might be able to accumulate a sufficient stock for offensive
purposes. / think we should follow the principle of
the gambler who has the heaviest purse and force our adversary's
hand and make him go on spending until he is a
pauper. As a matter of fact, we are not very sure about this
shortage of ammunition. Von Arnim commands the Fourth
Army in the North opposite the Belgians where a small
amount of ammunition would suffice, while all that could be
made available may have been sent to Arras and Champagne
where heavy fighting was in progress at the time he issued
his order.
1 This is an assumption that Germans attack, i.e., do not take their men to
Italy. —D. LL. G.