WAR MEMOIRS OF DAVID LLOYD GEORGE 1917

CAMPAIGN OF THE MUD: PASSCHENDAELE 331
what must be the underlying idea of the operations, i.e., to break
through the enemy's trench system and get to open fighting with
the least possible delay so as to defeat the troops immediately
available before they can be reinforced. The depth of the enemy's
trench system is not so great as to preclude the hope of doing
this were observation of the rear lines available. This lack of
observation is undoubtedly the great obstacle to the achievement
of a rapid break-through, and the most effective way of overcoming
it is the employment of as large a number of tanks as is
found possible as a result of the reconnaissance now being carried
out.
These documents were never shown to me or to any of
my colleagues. The promised report on the project never materialised
until the summer, although we had been committed
by the incorporation of the project, without our knowledge,
in the Chantilly plan of campaign for 1917.
It is very important to observe that at that date G.H.Q.
in France laid down several essential conditions and criteria
of success. (1) That there must be not only great but "very
great" superiority in numbers and perhaps quality on our
side; (2) That before the operation began the enemy should
be drawn away from the British Front before the attacks
north of the Lys were launched; (3) That it must be in the
nature of a surprise to the enemy, that he shall not receive
such notification of the impending attack as would enable
him to bring up his reserves before the British Army could
break through his lines of defence; (4) That it must be a
clean break-through and not a grinding operation like that
of the Somme; (5) That it was dependent on the employment
of a large number of tanks as a means of overcoming
difficulties. These were regarded by the High Command in
January as conditions precedent to success.
When the attack was made later on, none of these conditions
were possible or even contemplated. By July the whole