WAR MEMOIRS OF DAVID LLOYD GEORGE 1917

282 WAR MEMOIRS OF DAVID LLOYD GEORGE
ican in the sense that, in reply to President Wilson's Peace
Note, the Allies had formulated their war aims, but the
Central Powers had not, and that on the present occasion we
did not propose to send any detailed answer until we had
received the reply of the Central Powers.
Those who directed the affairs of the nations knew in
their hearts that unless the issue was fought out to a finish,
any peace attained at that hour must be in the nature of a
truce — a slightly more lasting Peace of Amiens, with war
to be renewed on the first pretext when the nations had
rested and reequipped. Germany would have guarded against
a repetition of the mistakes which had prevented her plans
coming off at the start and were now standing in the way of
her complete triumph. In 1914 she did not anticipate a
protracted war and was therefore not prepared for it. She
would have seen to it that next time her stores of copper and
rubber were adequate. When war broke out, her granaries
had no war reserves. In spite of that fact, she had committed
the rashness of selling corn to Holland. She had no
stock of fertilisers and her soil was now therefore impoverished
without hope of renewal. She had underestimated the
expenditure of ammunition in war under modern conditions.
She had therefore no adequate supply of certain essentials.
Necessary food ingredients, especially fats, were exhausted,
and comforts like coffee were no longer available. All this
she could provide against during a long truce, and it need
not be very long.
"Never again" for her military leaders did not mean
no more war, but not another war under such improvident
conditions. France and Italy also had their military "Never
agains." Both had committed errors of judgment and were
guilty of equally disastrous omissions which delayed victory
and nearly brought them irreparable defeat.
Had France foreseen the march through Belgium which