WAR MEMOIRS OF DAVID LLOYD GEORGE 1917

390 WAR MEMOIRS OF DAVID LLOYD GEORGE
had failed to realise their full scope. I felt that we were not
in a position to play with the disintegrating forces that were
operating in all belligerent countries on both sides, but more
especially on the side of the Allies, owing to the hopeless
position of Russia. Every one would know that we were
aiming at a much greater prize than Sir Douglas Haig's first
objective and that the real object of our operations was to
clear the Belgian coast. Only that morning I had noticed an
extract from the Frankfurter Zeitung, which showed that
our intentions were already realised in Germany. In reckoning
up our chances of success I pointed out that we must
advance fifteen miles before we could really begin the first
operation for freeing the Belgian coast. What reason, I asked,
was there to believe that we could first drive the enemy back
fifteen miles and then capture a place ten miles away? For
a success on this scale one of the following conditions was
essential:
1. An overwhelming force of men and guns;
2. That the enemy should be attacked so strongly elsewhere
that his reserves would be drawn off;
3. That the enemy's morale should be so broken that
he could no longer put up a fight.
None of the above conditions obtained at that time.
The numerical superiority of the Allies on the Western
Front, including 25,200 Portuguese, 18,000 Russians, who
were forming committees and talking revolution, and 131,000
Belgians, did not exceed IS per cent. More than this, however:
the French did not, in their present temper, count as
available for any offensive enterprise on a great scale. They
were a little out of hand and wanted rest, so that the French
Government had been obliged to grant them extended leave.
In comparing the value of the French and German soldier, it
had to be remembered that the French soldiers represented
one out of six of the population, whereas the Germans only