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WAR MEMOIRS OF DAVID LLOYD GEORGE 1917

WAR MEMOIRS OF DAVID LLOYD GEORGE 1917

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568 <strong>WAR</strong> <strong>MEMOIRS</strong> <strong>OF</strong> <strong>DAVID</strong> <strong>LLOYD</strong> <strong>GEORGE</strong><br />

The military chiefs had already, in the winter of 1916,<br />

planned their campaigns for <strong>1917</strong> on the same rigid and arid<br />

lines as they had pursued in 1915 and 1916, achieving nothing<br />

but a horrifying carnage unparalleled in the annals of<br />

war. This time they felt certain that their one great idea<br />

must succeed at last. They had made a few changes and improvements<br />

to correct little mistakes they had discovered<br />

last time in the action of their great plan. Moreover, they<br />

were confident that the German troops had deteriorated in<br />

quality since last year. So first the French were to conduct<br />

a great hurtling offensive with masses of their troops on a<br />

wide front, with the help of a diverting attack in the north<br />

by the British on a narrower front. Then if these operations<br />

did not finally succeed in driving the German Army out of<br />

their entrenchments, the British Army were to undertake<br />

another attack, and propel hundreds of thousands of their<br />

best troops against the German fortresses in Flanders, in<br />

order to expel the Germans from the Flemish coast, and then<br />

fall on their exposed flank with masses of cavalry. It was all<br />

based on the dynamics of the butting head against a tremendous<br />

wall — in this case a wall bristling with machine<br />

guns. It is only fair to the military intelligence to state that<br />

the British were not enamoured of the French plan, and the<br />

French were at first quite indifferent and eventually contemptuous<br />

of the British project. Haig did not believe in the<br />

Nivelle strategy and Petain and Foch scoffed at Haig's "duck<br />

march" in Flanders. They judged wisely of each other's<br />

plans if not of their own. That is a common attribute in all<br />

human affairs. They nevertheless agreed, in that spirit of<br />

fraternal toleration and accommodation that ought to prevail<br />

amongst partners, to try both — in turn. Neither of the<br />

two schemes had a reasonable chance of succeeding, for reasons<br />

which I gave before they were ever attempted. But the<br />

military staffs clutched at their respective projects. With

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