WAR MEMOIRS OF DAVID LLOYD GEORGE 1917

358 WAR MEMOIRS OF DAVID LLOYD GEORGE
tions, and we must be prepared for the possibility of great developments
and ready to take full advantage of them.
11. The extent of the success gained will depend much on the
concentration and continuity of effort at the right time and
place, and the necessary concentration must be attained by a
bold reduction of force at other points, and by ensuring that to
the utmost extent possible every fit man takes his place in the
ranks. Army Commanders will satisfy themselves that, during
the coming offensive, no man fit to be in the ranks is employed
elsewhere without most urgent and necessary reason.
12. The drafts available to replace casualties are limited in
number and in the great struggle before us it is essential that,
without in the least degree relaxing the strength and continuity
of our efforts, we shall conserve the energy of our officers and men
so that we may outstay the enemy. For this the utmost use must
be made of all means of offence and defence at our disposal. All
ground gained must be held, by rifle and bayonet alone if no
assistance is obtainable from other arms. In the attack, more
especially in the earlier attacks, each step must be thoroughly
prepared and organised. Every advance must be carried out
steadily — but none the less vigorously — with thorough combination
and mutual support between the troops employed. The
tendency of isolated bodies of troops to dash forward beyond the
reach of support must be held in check. This tendency, springing
from the finest motives, is of the greatest value if controlled and
used for adequate objects, whereas if uncontrolled and misapplied
it leads to the loss of many of the most gallant officers and men
without the gain of compensating advantages.
Conducting our operations on these principles, as has been
done with such success on so many previous occasions during the
past twelve months, we may look forward with confidence to still
greater successes in the near future.
It will be seen that it was not a campaign for the capture
of the village of Passchendaele. That in itself would only
have added to the difficulties of the British Army by substi-