WAR MEMOIRS OF DAVID LLOYD GEORGE 1917

CAMPAIGN OF THE MUD: PASSCHENDAELE 353
tion. The idea, as I have already mentioned, was originally
his. The whole ground had been thoroughly observed, surveyed
and registered under the direction of General Harington,
one of the outstanding Staff Officers of the War. It
is not too much to say that had he been at G.H.Q., Passchendaele
would never have become one of the blackest horrors
of history. One special feature of the Messines attack was the
elaborate undermining of the German advanced positions.
For months companies of men had been burrowing under the
German advanced positions. Nothing was left to chance.
Plumer believed not only in the possibility of making an
effective attack on the Messines Ridge, but in the advantage
which would be gained by the garrison of the Ypres
salient through securing possession of the high ground
on the right from which the German artillery poured
their deadly missiles on our trenches and communications,
every part of which was under their observation.
But Plumer wished to treat it as an isolated operation and
not as part of a general offensive in Flanders. To this last
he was opposed, although the War Committee were not informed
of his doubts. For reasons which the event revealed,
he did not believe in the feasibility of an attack on a great
scale in that area and at that time. Although later on he
carried out the particular operation that was entrusted to
him in the attack on the Passchendaele-Staden Ridge with
skill and success, he was never convinced of the wisdom of
this particular campaign. In fact, the more he saw of the
ground, the more rooted became his aversion to the whole
plan. When I met him in Paris in November, on his way to
take command of the British Army in Italy, he told me that
he was delighted to get away from that "terrible mud." He
put the Messines attack in a totally different category. The
position was one which had an important tactical value for
the British Army in that area. It was a life-saving operation,