WAR MEMOIRS OF DAVID LLOYD GEORGE 1917

CAMPAIGN OF THE MUD! PASSCHENDAELE 411
have gone behind these potentates and in the middle of the
battle conducted an inquisition into the methods of the High
Command, encouraging officers and men to tell us what they
thought of their superiors? We had before our eyes the
example of the semi-public intervention of the French in
the case of the Nivelle offensive. Some of the most distinguished
generals in the French Army were opposed to that
offensive. Some of the ablest generals in our own Army were
doubtful of the wisdom of initiating and pursuing this
offensive. But there was a vital difference in the two cases.
The dissentient French generals communicated their doubts
frankly to the Government. Our generals imparted their
views to the Commander-in-Chief, but never whispered one
hint of their hesitation to any politician. One of them afterwards
informed me that had I asked him the question at the
time, he would have placed loyalty to his Commander first.
The Nivelle precedent had its drawbacks. It stopped that
attack, but came dangerously near to fomenting general
mutiny in the French Army. The result was almost fatal to
the cohesion and confidence of the French Army. It put it
out of effective action for months. We could not risk a repetition
of that experiment at this time. The British Army was
then the one Allied Army in the field which could be absolutely
relied upon for any enterprise, however hazardous
and arduous it might be. We could not take any chances with
it. It is said that I ought to have taken the risks and stopped
the carnage. Let me confess that there were, and still are,
moments when I am of the same opinion. But let those who
are inclined to condemn me and the War Cabinet for not
taking the hazard, weigh carefully and fairly the conditions
at that time.
Passchendaele could not have been stopped without dismissing
Sir Douglas Haig. Sir William Robertson would have
resigned. Had both disappeared without any preliminary fuss