WAR MEMOIRS OF DAVID LLOYD GEORGE 1917

THE CAPORETTO DISASTER 471
but Italy, the Allies and most grievously of all, the chances
of a favourable peace in 1917.
That was the end of the project of a combined offensive
in Italy. Unfortunately, the Germans took a different view of
the possibilities of that front in the late autumn and the
early winter. They knew that an offensive late in October
was a feasible operation.
As the futile massacres of August piled up the ghastly
hecatombs of slaughter on the Ypres Front without achieving
any appreciable result, I repeatedly approached Sir
William Robertson to remind him of the condition attached
to the Cabinet's assent to the operation. It was to be abandoned
as soon as it became evident that its aims were unattainable
this year and our attention was to be concentrated
on an Italian offensive. He was immovable. He attributed the
slowness of our progress to the exceptional rains. As soon
as the weather improved we should sweep onward. As we
know now, ten weeks more fighting with huge casualties gave
us two more miles and then the furthest point was reached,
without the achievement of any strategical result. But Robertson
still believed in the possibility of great things after
we had worn down the enemy's strength. According to him
everything pointed to the growing exhaustion of the German
Army. Why give in when we might be near a real triumph
for our arms? I especially recollect a conversation with him,
when he came down at my request to a house in Sussex
where I was taking a few days' rest qualified by papers and
interviews. (One of these interviews had been with Baron
Sonnino.) From the lawn we could hear the thud of the guns
of Passchendaele. To all my pleadings Robertson tendered
a sullen negative. His final answer to my plea I only read
long afterwards. It was a long message to Cadorna, making
it clear that he must expect no help from us. The Passchendaele
offensive was to be pressed for several more weeks and