WAR MEMOIRS OF DAVID LLOYD GEORGE 1917

588 WAR MEMOIRS OF DAVID LLOYD GEORGE
Russian Front is practically limited to exchanging fresh
troops there for tired ones from the West. But the number of
her good divisions in the East is limited and moreover, it is
estimated that her transport facilities will only suffice to
move ten divisions a month from the East.
For all these reasons we are justified in calculating that
the Allies will have a considerable superiority in infantry
on the front of attack — probably not less than two to one.
And our capacity for exchanging tired divisions for fresh
ones along our defensive line will not be less than that of
the Germans.
In guns and ammunition, judging by experience and information
from captured orders, etc., our superiority will be
even greater; while in the air we may regard our superiority
as still more assured. The last-mentioned factor is of immense
importance from the points of view of artillery efficiency,
information, damage behind the enemy's lines, and
general morale.
As regards the alternative to an attack in Belgium,
namely, attacking Austria from Italy, the arguments against
this are overwhelmingly stronger than those in favour
of it.
It has always been accepted as the most elective form
of war to attack and destroy the enemy's strongest forces as
soon as possible IF THERE IS A REASONABLE PROSPECT OF
SUCCESS. // there is not a reasonable prospect of success the
next best course is to weaken the enemy by holding his main
forces and attacking his weaker ones, if that be possible. The
possibility depends, however, firstly on being able to hold his
main forces, and secondly, on being able to defeat his weaker
ones.
If we were to detach largely to Italy it is probable that
we could still hold the Germans on the Western Front, but
it is not certain and it would depend much on the French.