WAR MEMOIRS OF DAVID LLOYD GEORGE 1917

THE CAPORETTO DISASTER 475
ister of Munitions and will have the information when we
next meet, but you will understand that this also depends
upon the requirements of the British Armies in France,
which in turn depends upon the development of the operations
now in progress.
"I shall be obliged if you will give me your views on the
questions raised by our Governments, and will inform me
when and where it will be convenient for us to have a meeting
with General Foch, so that we may prepare a joint reply
to be presented to the Allied Conference which is to assemble
in Paris between 10th and 15th September, 1917.
Yours sincerely,
W. R. ROBERTSON."
This letter was shown to me. It might otherwise have
been couched in different terms. It emphatically stamped
on Cadorna's faint hopes of receiving any effective assistance
in men or guns from the British Army.
Cadorna was about to launch another attack. It was not
a stimulating letter to be sent to a general on the eve of a
battle. This onslaught shared the usual fate of Italian offensives.
It started well, promised considerable results, but
had to be abandoned for lack of ammunition. General
Delme-Radcliffe wrote, imploring us to send help. I wrote to
the C.I.G.S.:
"26th August, 1917.
"My dear Chief of Staff,
"The Italian attack seems to me to be developing well, and
judging by the reports that come from Delme-Radcliffe, there
are great possibilities in it if fully and promptly exploited. I can,
of course, only judge by what he says, but his account of the
Austrian demoralisation and of their lack of reserves — both
confirmed by the number of prisoners and guns captured and the
extent of the ground occupied — seems to me to indicate immediate
prospects of a signal military victory on that front. I need