WAR MEMOIRS OF DAVID LLOYD GEORGE 1917

CAMPAIGN OF THE MUD: PASSCHENDAELE 329
order to clear the Belgian coast was suggested to him, he
deprecated the proposal. He thought the ground unsuitable
for such an attack and that it would be a prolonged and
very costly operation. Headquarters tried to reassure him
by suggesting that it afforded the chance of a surprise breakthrough.
The first document issued by G.H.Q. on the idea of a
great Flanders offensive is very significant. I wish it had envisaged
not merely the first, but also the final reaction of
Headquarters upon the venture. It is signed by General Kiggell,
the Chief of the General Staff in France.
"G.H.Q.,
6th January, 1917.
"Second Army.
"With reference to your G.352, dated the 12th December,
1916, giving your plan for offensive operations north of the river
LYS, the Commander-in-Chief desires me to draw your attention
to the following points with a view to re-casting the plan.
"1. The operations north of the river LYS will not take place
until after the subsidiary British attacks elsewhere and main
French offensive operations have been carried out. It is therefore
to be anticipated that the enemy will have been severely handled
and his reserves drawn away from your front before the attacks
north of the LYS are launched.
"Under these circumstances it is essential that the plan should
be based on rapid action and entail the breaking through of the
enemy 9 s defences on a wide front without any delay.
"2. The plan, as submitted by you, indicates a sustained and
deliberate offensive such as has been carried out recently on the
SOMME Front. In these circumstances the enemy will have time
to bring up fresh reinforcements and construct new lines of
defence.
"3. The object of these operations is to inflict a decisive defeat
on the enemy and to free the Belgian coast.
"The immediate intention is to break through the enemy de-