Full text PDF - International Policy Network

More documents

Recommendations

Info

Corruption in public health 99 Figure 5 Proportion who make informal payments among users of health services, selected countries Albania (2001) Armenia (2001) Bosnia (2002) Bulgaria (2001) Croatia (2002) Czech Republic (2002) Hungary (2002) Kosovo (2000) Kyrgyz Republic (2001) Latvia (1998) Macedonia (2002) Moldova (2002) Romania (2000) Russia (2002) Slovakia (2000) Bangladesh (2002) India (2002) Nepal (2002) Pakistan (2002) Sri Lanka (2001) Bolivia (2002) Colombia (2001) Paraguay (1999) Peru (2001) Cambodia (2000) Indonesia (2001) Thailand (2000) Vietnam (1992) Ghana (2000) 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 Source: See Source Appendix I sector alternatives that require significant out-of-pocket payments where consumers tend to have more influence on performance. The Czech Republic appears odd given the rest of ECA but consis-
100 Fighting the Diseases of Poverty tent with other findings. Public providers with a monopoly position are in a stronger position to charge patients extra for their services. Kosovars have not had access to public health care for decades and have financed care out of pocket to private providers. Thais too rely on the private sector for some of their health care. The higher rates reported for Colombia and Bolivia, however, would question that explanation since Colombia has a large private health system not too different from Peru’s. The differences may reflect different degrees of oversight in public clinics and hospitals, but more indepth work would be necessary to reach a firm conclusion since the approach to measuring informal payments varies across countries. Figure 6 extends the informal payment distribution to encompass differences in outpatient and inpatient payments and includes some countries from Figure 5. With the exception of Bulgaria, inpatient care is more likely to be financed via informal payments, and often the disparity between the two types of services is dramatic, as is the case with Bangladesh, Tajikistan, Armenia and Albania. Evidence for four Eastern European countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Romania) reveals that formal payment are associated with primary and outpatient specialist care and informal payments with surgery and inpatient services (Belli, 2002). Households either feel the need to pay for hospitalizations or providers don’t give them a choice insisting on payment if services are to be rendered. Perception surveys of providers or citizens offer additional insights. In Costa Rica 85 per cent of medical staffs indicated that under-the-table payments to physicians were common, and half of patients said they made payments in public facilities roughly equivalent to 50 per cent of a private sector consultation. In Bolivia the incidence of informal payments was significantly correlated with perceptions of corruption in specific public hospitals, and 40 per cent of interviewed patients acknowledged making illicit payments for care (Gray-Molina et. al, 2001), this is similar to the results of a household survey in 106 Bolivian municipalities reportedly that 45
Page 1 and 2:
Fighting the Diseases of Poverty Ed
Page 3 and 4:
About International Policy Network
Page 5 and 6:
Fighting the Diseases of Poverty Ed
Page 8 and 9:
The authors Johan Biermann is a pla
Page 10:
The authors ix Maureen has publishe
Page 13 and 14:
xii Fighting the Diseases of Povert
Page 15 and 16:
xiv Fighting the Diseases of Povert
Page 17 and 18:
xvi Fighting the Diseases of Povert
Page 19 and 20:
xviii Fighting the Diseases of Pove
Page 21 and 22:
xx Fighting the Diseases of Poverty
Page 23 and 24:
xxii Fighting the Diseases of Pover
Page 25 and 26:
xxiv Fighting the Diseases of Pover
Page 27 and 28:
xxvi Fighting the Diseases of Pover
Page 29 and 30:
xxviii Fighting the Diseases of Pov
Page 31 and 32:
2 Fighting the Diseases of Poverty
Page 33 and 34:
Page 35 and 36:
Page 37 and 38:
Page 39 and 40:
Page 41 and 42:
Page 43 and 44:
Page 45 and 46:
Page 47 and 48:
Page 49 and 50:
Page 51 and 52:
Page 53 and 54:
Page 55 and 56:
Page 57 and 58:
Page 59 and 60:
Page 61 and 62:
Page 63 and 64:
Page 65 and 66:
2 South Africa’s healthcare under
Page 67 and 68:
Page 69 and 70:
Page 71 and 72:
Page 73 and 74:
Page 75 and 76:
Page 77 and 78: 48 Fighting the Diseases of Poverty
Page 127: 98 Fighting the Diseases of Poverty
Page 131 and 132: 102 Fighting the Diseases of Povert
Page 155 and 156: 4 Diseases of poverty and the 10/90
Page 179 and 180:
150 Fighting the Diseases of Povert
Page 181 and 182:
Page 183 and 184:
Page 185 and 186:
Page 187 and 188:
Page 189 and 190:
Page 191 and 192:
Page 193 and 194:
Page 195 and 196:
Page 197 and 198:
Page 199 and 200:
Page 201 and 202:
Page 203 and 204:
Page 205 and 206:
Page 207 and 208:
Page 209 and 210:
Page 211 and 212:
Page 214 and 215:
6 Cost effective means of fighting
Page 216 and 217:
Cost effective means of fighting th
Page 218 and 219:
Page 220 and 221:
Page 222 and 223:
Page 224 and 225:
Page 226 and 227:
Page 228 and 229:
Page 230 and 231:
Page 232 and 233:
7 Counterfeit medicines in LDCs: pr
Page 234 and 235:
Counterfeit medicines in LDCs: prob
Page 236 and 237:
Page 238 and 239:
Page 240 and 241:
Page 242 and 243:
Page 244 and 245:
The value of vaccination 215 In the
Page 246 and 247:
The value of vaccination 217 the di
Page 248 and 249:
The value of vaccination 219 ◆
Page 250 and 251:
The value of vaccination 221 Figure
Page 252 and 253:
The value of vaccination 223 vaccin
Page 254 and 255:
The value of vaccination 225 moreov
Page 256 and 257:
The value of vaccination 227 encour
Page 258 and 259:
The value of vaccination 229 packag
Page 260 and 261:
The value of vaccination 231 longer
Page 262 and 263:
The value of vaccination 233 2005 t
Page 264 and 265:
The value of vaccination 235 long-t
Page 266 and 267:
The value of vaccination 237 Table
Page 268 and 269:
9 The World Health Organisation: a
Page 270 and 271:
The World Health Organisation: a ti
Page 272 and 273:
Page 274 and 275:
Page 276 and 277:
Page 278 and 279:
Page 280 and 281:
Page 282 and 283:
Page 284 and 285:
Page 286 and 287:
Page 288 and 289:
Page 290 and 291:
Page 292 and 293:
Page 294 and 295:
Notes Introduction 1 The UN Human D
Page 296 and 297:
Notes 267 18 The decline in their G
Page 298 and 299:
Notes 269 4 The diseases of poverty
Page 300 and 301:
Notes 271 to high-levels of researc
Page 302 and 303:
Notes 273 to register new products,
Page 304 and 305:
Notes 275 2 Snow, B et al., “The
Page 306 and 307:
Sources 277 Karoly, L., Greenwood,
Page 308 and 309:
Sources 279 ——— . 2004. The S
Page 310 and 311:
Sources 281 University, March 13. A
Page 312 and 313:
Sources 283 Alcazar, L and Andrade,
Page 314 and 315:
Sources 285 Di Tella, R. and Savedo
Page 316 and 317:
Sources 287 La Forgia, G. 2005. Hea
Page 318 and 319:
Sources 289 Shishkin, Sergey. 2003.
Page 320 and 321:
Sources 291 4 The diseases of pover
Page 322 and 323:
Sources 293 Wofford, D., & Shanahan
Page 324 and 325:
Sources 295 6 Cost effective means
Page 326 and 327:
Sources 297 7 Counterfeit medicines
Page 328 and 329:
The Campaign for Fighting Diseases
Page 330 and 331:
Dr. Henry I. Miller joined the Food
show all

Full text PDF - International Policy Network

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?