25.10.2014 Views

Full text PDF - International Policy Network

Full text PDF - International Policy Network

Full text PDF - International Policy Network

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

Corruption in public health 109<br />

ments in transition and developing countries, but there are good<br />

examples of things that can be done based on actual experiences.<br />

This section is divided by category to summarize the evidence and<br />

link these lessons to specific agendas. Accountability and incentives<br />

serve as threads across the components because they represent the<br />

keys to better policy and outcomes.<br />

Key accountability measures include (i) information on performance<br />

and impact, (ii) the ability to audit, (iii) the authority to<br />

reward performance, and discipline, transfer and terminate employees<br />

who engage in abuses; and (iv) answering to stakeholders on<br />

the performance of public services. Accountability tends to be<br />

absent due in part to measurement problems but also to minimal<br />

management, oversight or evaluation of performance. The high<br />

demand from patients for diagnosis and care when they fall ill, and<br />

the difficulty in generalizing across medical conditions further complicate<br />

oversight and accountability.<br />

Improving government effectiveness<br />

The health system that delivers health care is only as good as its<br />

management. This section focuses on government initiatives and<br />

management tools that can raise effectiveness and performance.<br />

Adequate incentives for health professionals lie more in the<br />

structure of the health care system and its financing than in limited<br />

actions that fix existing arrangements. Fundamentally money needs<br />

to follow patients at least in terms of tying medical staff time to<br />

specific patients. Paying providers whether they see (or are<br />

assigned) patients or not, and compensating under and over-performance<br />

equally is both unfair and unlikely to build the trust<br />

needed in a public health system. How that is accomplished is the<br />

challenge, and there are options.<br />

The exception to money following patients may be capitated<br />

payments where physicians receive a fixed prospective payment for<br />

each patient and extends services as needed. It has been shown to<br />

be highly effective at providing the necessary incentives for<br />

providers, but typically is combined with clear management and

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!