l4sfdrx

UKUSA - CREATING THE GLOBAL SIGINT ALLIANCE 97
However, the sharing of material on other parts of the world
remained selective, reflecting the political tensions of the
moment. In 1948, even while the UKUSA alliance was gradually
being drawn together, Britain and America were at loggerheads
over Palestine and the emerging state of Israel. There was
anxiety in London about sharing intelligence on the Middle East
with the Americans. On 15 February 1948, Britain's Joint
Intelligence Committee discussed the problem of circulating its
own reports, which included material from SIS and GCHQ, to
the newly formed CIA. Although British intelligence representatives
in Washington were not aware of a specific 'pro-Zionist
bloc in the Central Intelligence Agency', nevertheless they
asserted that 'Jewish sympathisers were no doubt included in
its establishment', and complained that there had been leaks.
William Hayter, the Chair of the JIC, insisted that its material
on Palestine should be shown in the first instance only to the
Director of Central Intelligence in person. He added that 'It
should be explained to him that if he could not guarantee that
they would not fall imo pro-Zionist hands, then he could not
be left with them.' Even so, it was decided to withhold more
sensitive recent reports on Palestine from the Americans.32
Meanwhile, 'Operation Gold', run by US Navy intelligence, was
intercepting the cable traffic of Jewish arms smugglers, but this
was not being shared with Britain, or indeed acted upon. 33
American links with the Commonwealth parties were also
hesitant. The Americans were slow to do business with the
Canadians. They worried about how much GCHQ had told the
Canadians about Anglo-American agreements, and suspected
that GCHQ was secretly giving Ottawa some American sigint. 34
During the 1948 discussions of possible CAN-USA sigint agreements,
it became clear that the US Communications Intelligence
Board was anxious to prevent an information free-for-all. It
preferred to hand material to the Canadians on a 'need to know'
basis, and was anxious to prevent a proliferation of sigint liaison
officers. 35 Meanwhile, somewhat foolishly, Canada resisted the
all-important standardisation of security procedures that was a