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INTELLIGENCE FOR DOOMSDAY 247<br />

In the late I960s the West had launched a charm offensive<br />

towards the Eastem Bloc called 'detente', which aimed to<br />

encourage precisely the liberal tendencies that Brezhnev had<br />

now cracked down on. The invasion of Czechoslovakia in August<br />

1968 did not derail Western efforts to pursue detente. However,<br />

it did raise awkward questions. NATO forces had presumed a<br />

good degree of warning of any Soviet attack on the West, but<br />

would they actually receive this warning if a Third World War<br />

broke out The invasion also prompted British commanders in<br />

Germany to think harder about intelligence in the first anxious<br />

hours of a confrontation between East and West. Although<br />

Brixmis provided a fabulous source of both operational and<br />

technical intelligence, it was a peacetime mission and was<br />

expected to be rounded up before any military action took place.<br />

Thereafter, commanders would need a reliable source of intelligence.<br />

Their primary need was to track the movement of the<br />

main Soviet thrusts, together with reinforcements mustering<br />

anything up to three hundred miles to the rear. In a future war,<br />

British commanders would hope to disrupt the Warsaw Pact's<br />

emerging battle plan and destroy its momentum. The most<br />

demanding task would be surveillance well behind the enemy<br />

front line.<br />

One might have expected senior British commanders to have<br />

turned to sigint and GCHQ. Instead, during the 1960s those in<br />

Germany seem to have rejected the wonders of electronic monitoring<br />

in favour of the least technical option, human reconnaissance<br />

from 'stay-behind patrols'. This was often referred to<br />

in the local parlance of hardy special forces soldiers as 'the Mk.1.<br />

Eyeball'. From the onset of any future war, intelligence inside<br />

the Soviet-occupied areas would have been provided by dedicated<br />

stay-behind parties from NATO special forces. Prevailing<br />

doctrine suggested that these special forces had several deeppenetration<br />

roles in wartime. These included the collection of<br />

intelligence by active or passive methods, offensive operations<br />

by small parties, cooperation with partisans or guerrillas, and<br />

assistance to escapers such as downed pilots. However, in the

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