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SIGINT IN THE SUN - GCHQ'S OVERSEAS EMPIRE 167
from local radio direction-finding and voice interception.
Telephone tapping on the Indonesian side of the border was
also very productive. Meanwhile, higher-level Indonesian diplomatic
traffic was also being read in Singapore and at GCHQ at
Cheltenham. 72 The result was 'high-grade intelligence that
contributed significantly to the successful outcome of the
conflict'.73 Because of Australian worries about the disputed
territory of West Irian, Indonesia remained Australia's main
signals intelligence priority through the 1960s, even higher than
Vietnam. 74
By March 1965 the British government was asking how long
the Confrontation would last. The Joint Intelligence Committee
Far East, which included Brian Tovey from GCHQ, did its best
to answer this. Sigint was a helpful indicator, since it showed
that Sukarno was deploying large-scale units of the Indonesian
Army's strategic reserve to Kalimantan, and further units seemed
to be moving to Sumatra. All this suggested that Sukarno was
not yet finished. Negotiations were getting nowhere, and the
only serious rebellion inside Indonesia, on the island of Celebes,
had suffered a setback. Sukarno was known to be ill, and optimistic
officials hoped his death might be followed by an internal
struggle between the Army and the Indonesian Communist Party.
The intelligence from SIS was that 'Sukarno may die at any
time. Without an operation he is unlikely to last more than a
year.' In fact the Indonesian Premier seemed to be in alarmingly
rude health, and the British Ambassador in Jakarta was
sceptical about 'secret sources' on this subject. 75 Although there
had been an abortive coup in September 1965, Sukarno was
still clinging on, and by the end of the year the British Chiefs
of Staff were considering serious military escalation, including
much deeper Claret operations and commando raids into
Sumatra. 76 The British effort now developed a significant naval
component, with no less than a third of the entire British fleet
deployed off Sumatra, often operating openly in Indonesian
waters. Once again, signals intercepts were a crucial element in
the naval campaign. 77