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170 FIGHTING THE ELECTRONIC WAR<br />

in the benefits to be derived from tapping Soviet and Satellite<br />

landlines on a scale not previously considered necessary. The<br />

loss of certain sources during this period created gaps in our<br />

intelligence coverage which were particularly unfortunate during<br />

this period of Cold War escalation.' By tapping into telephone<br />

lines, the West hoped to pick up sensitive voice traffic that the<br />

Soviets were not troubling to encrypt, because unlike messages<br />

sent by radio transmitter, underground landlines were thought<br />

to be inaccessible and therefore secure. 2<br />

The idea of tapping phone lines in Vienna and Berlin mirrored<br />

existing activities by the KGB. As early as October 1946, the<br />

British Control Commission in Germany had reviewed the<br />

twenty-two 'secrephones' or scrambler phones installed in Berlin<br />

for communication with the British Zone of Germany, and had<br />

found them wanting. The encypherment provided by the scrambler<br />

was weak, and with the telephone lines passing through<br />

the Soviet Zone, they were presumed to be tapped. Even within<br />

the British Zone, the military had been anxious about allowing<br />

Germans who worked in telephone exchanges to have access<br />

to military telephone directories, since this would give them a<br />

'comprehensive guide to the most profitable extensions on which<br />

to listen in'. Only specially screened Germans were put to work<br />

in the telephone exchanges. 3<br />

Poor telephone security had the potential to blow high-grade<br />

British cyphers. For example, it had long been known that the<br />

direct telephone line between the British element of the Allied<br />

Commission for Austria and London was monitored by the<br />

Soviets, and in early February 1948 British intelligence had<br />

discovered that they were 'strengthening their interception<br />

arrangements'. The problem was that although officials in the<br />

British headquarters in Vienna were given continual security<br />

warnings, the officials they were talking to in London were less<br />

diligent. Frequently, telephone conversations were about<br />

agreeing the final text of a document, which was then sent by<br />

telegram in a high-grade cypher. For the Soviet code-breakers<br />

this was a gift, since they now had both the encyphered text

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