l4sfdrx

SHOOTDOWNS, CYPHERS AND SPENDING 221
the servant would soon be paid more than its master. It was
hardly surprising that a serious review had now been triggered. 74
In mid-May 1962 the Chair of the JIC, Hugh Stephenson,
went to the Treasury for an informal brainstorming session with
Burke Trend to decide who should chair the review. 75 Trend was
a rising star in the Treasury who had a special fascination with
the intelligence services, and presided over their budgets. Their
eventual choice was Sir Stuart Hampshire, an Oxford philosophy
don. Hampshire seemed an improbable figure to review
the future of Britain's most technical intelligence agency. With
a First in Greats, he may have commanded the respect of civil
servants, but he had no background in maths or science. Having
been elected a Fellow of All Souls in 1936, he joined the Army
in 1940. His otherworldly nature ensured that his superiors were
reluctant to let him loose with a compass and a pistol, so he
was moved into intelligence. By late 1942 he was in SIS, working
alongside Hugh Trevor-Roper and the Radio Security Service.
Some of his time was spent at Bletchley Park, and in July 1944
he found himself deliberating over the July Bomb Plot against
Hitler with several other young SIS officers. 76 Like Trend,
Hampshire had a romantic fascination with intelligence, and he
later confessed that he had greatly enjoyed 'the spectacle of
duplicity and deceit in secret intelligence during the war'.77
GCHQ prepared for the review by producing a report on the
'State of Sigint' and material on 'Interception Deployment in
the Sixties and Seventies', and forecasting the costs of research
and development. 78 In July it offered a historical summary of
its post-war activities running to almost forty pages. The first
versions were regarded as evasive by Whitehall, offering 'no
assessment of the extent to which their policies had succeeded'.
After much coaxing, later drafts identified precisely what had
been achieved by the two five-year MTI programmes. 79 Bill
Millward, GCHQ's Principal Establishments Officer, offered an
account of the core activities against Soviet systems. This was
painful for several reasons. It not only put an unsuccessful
programme under the spotlight, it also required GCHQ to let