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520 GCHQ GOES GLOBAL<br />

that in the week before what was expected to be a second resolution,<br />

the diplomat:> from the 'Group of Six' were in fact<br />

working on their own secret plans for a compromise solution<br />

which they hoped would avert war. 'Only the people in the<br />

room knew what the document said,' recalls Zinser. He added<br />

that the surprising thing was the very rapid nature of the<br />

American response to the proposal. The meeting putting it<br />

together took place in the evening, and Zinser received a call<br />

from US diplomats early the next morning. He told them the<br />

group was looking for a compromise. The Americans' response<br />

was: 'Do not attempt it.' In the end it was the French who<br />

pulled the plug on the possibility of a second UN resolution.<br />

On 10 March President Jacques Chirac announced that France<br />

would use its veto in the Security Council to block any such<br />

move, resulting in public acrimony between Paris and<br />

Washington. Few realised that war was now only ten days<br />

away.36<br />

Although the French and German governments were strongly<br />

opposed to war with Iraq, their own intelligence services insisted<br />

that the country had an active weapons of mass destruction<br />

(WMD) programme. The fact that the respected German BND<br />

loudly asserted this, even though Chancellor Gerhard Schroder<br />

was opposed to war, convinced many independent observers<br />

that there must be some hard evidence of Iraqi WMD. The<br />

French DGSE was also telling President Chirac that Iraq had<br />

WMD. However, the sagacious Chirac made his own assessments,<br />

and believed that the Western intelligence services were<br />

deluded. In January 2003 he visited Hans Blix, the head of the<br />

UN Monitoring, Inspection and Verification Commission, who<br />

had been searching Iraq for evidence of WMD for many years.<br />

Blix recalls that by then his team 'had begun to have some<br />

doubts', although, by and large, even he still thought Iraq was<br />

hiding some weapons. By contrast, Chirac was highly suspicious,<br />

and 'was among the first who doubted the intelligence<br />

reports'. He understood how the Western intelligence agencies<br />

worked, continually bringing their specialists together and devel-

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