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246 SPACE, SPY SHIPS AND SCANDALS<br />

fabulous anthropological knowledge that Brixmis had developed<br />

over twenty years of watching its subject provided the key<br />

warning indicator. It had observed the Red Army going out on<br />

exercise countless times, and knew how it behaved. A routine<br />

exercise provided an opportunity to leave broken or faulty<br />

vehicles in barracks to be worked on by engineers. What marked<br />

this out as the 'real thing' was that the Soviets took everything<br />

with them. Vehicles were piled high with personal effects,<br />

showing that the troops were not expecting to come back for<br />

some time. Unserviceable vehicles were also taken. Indeed, there<br />

were so many of these that the Soviets ran out of towing chains,<br />

and made makeshift ones by plaiting fence chains together. This<br />

was a small detail, but to the expert watchers of Brixmis it spoke<br />

volumes. The Soviets were definitely up to something. 6<br />

Why did the JIC get the invasion of Czechoslovakia so badly<br />

wrong, despite such excellent indicators Quite simply because<br />

its chairman, a rather lofty diplomat called Denis Greenhill,<br />

refused to accept the evidence that was staring him in the face.<br />

He insisted that the Soviet mobilisation was only an attempt to<br />

apply psychological pressure, and argued that if he was in the<br />

Soviets' shoes he would think the wave of international criticism<br />

an invasion would provoke too high a price to pay. In other<br />

words, he thought like a British decision-maker, not a Russian<br />

one - a classic example of a basic analytical mistake called 'mirrorimaging'.<br />

The CIA made much the same mistake, and only the<br />

West Germans accurately predicted the invasion. After the<br />

inquiry, Dick White decided to beef up the Defence Intelligence<br />

Staff. His chosen instrument was the redoubtable Admiral Louis<br />

Le Bailly, whom he made Director General of Intelligence, or<br />

'DGI', at the Ministry of Defence. The DGI became Deputy Chair<br />

of the Joint Intelligence Committee, sitting alongside the senior<br />

military intelligence officer, who was already a member of the<br />

committee. The DGI was also boosted with his own personal<br />

staff. Thereafter, the diplomats and the military fought for control<br />

of Britain's central intelligence machinery.7<br />

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