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SIGINT IN THE SUN - GCHQ'S OVERSEAS EMPIRE 159
Deliberate American pressure on the pound eventually forced
Britain's ignominious withdrawal from Suez, and contributed
to Eden's sudden resignation in January 1957. Eden's foreign
policy may have failed, but the intelligence support he received
had been excellent. In the wake of Suez, Selwyn Lloyd wrote
to Eric Jones, the Director of GCHQ, congratulating him on the
torrents of Middle East intelligence that sigint had provided
during the crisis, particularly after the seizure of the canal. '1
have observed the volume of material which has been produced
by G.C.H.Q. relating to all the countries in the Middle East area,'
he wrote, suggesting that the traffic of many countries was being
read, and added: '1 am writing to let you know how valuable
we have found this material and how much 1 appreciate the
hard work and skill involved in its production.' Jones passed
on these congratulations to units such as the Army's 2 Wireless
Regiment on Cyprus and the RAP's 192 Squadron. 43 There had
also been shipborne signals interception by the Royal Navy. The
RAF airborne signals element was especially important during
the invasion. The ageing RB-29 Washingtons had been
despatched from Watton to map the characteristics of Egyptian
anti-aircraft defence. This included the habit of shutting down
air-defence radar routinely just after midday - a priceless piece
of information. 44
At a higher level, GCHQ read much of Cairo's diplomatic
traffic with key embassies in the region during the mid-1950s,
such as those in Amman and DamascusY It also read traffic
with Egypt's London Embassy.46 No less importantly, GCHQ
stepped up its watch on the Soviets. On 15 November 1956,
Britain's leaders were reassured that there was 'still no evidence
from signals intelligence sources of any large-scale Soviet preparations
to intervene by force in the Middle East' Y However, there
had been problems. Some of the newly civilianised sigint sites
had complained about working round the clock during the crisis,
causing managers to wonder about the wisdom of non-military
intercept operations. 48 * * *