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120 FIGHTING THE ELECTRONIC WAR
Most of the airfields and the operational procedures for the
Soviet Union's nuclear air force in the European theatre had
been mapped by 1952. 39 In June of that year a team from the
US Air Force Security Service centre at Brooks Field, led by
Major Hill, visited GCHQ and one of its outstations at Knockholt
in Kent to further converge their activities in this area. Hill also
wanted to discuss the creation of new 'ground-based electronic
intercept stations' in Europe. Korea had greatly accelerated
preparations for a 'hot war', and GCHQ's elint success on Soviet
air defences helped it to justify budget increases. 4o
Throughout 1951 and 1952, global war often seemed imminent.
Communist China had entered the Korean War in 195 L
and numerous Soviet advisers were busy assisting the North
Korean forces. Soviet and American pilots were actually fighting
each other in the skies of East Asia. Although the public were
never told, sigint made this fact clear to the secret listeners. In
this increasingly fevered atmosphere, improved intelligence was
given a high priority. On 22 January 1952 the British Chiefs
of Staff met the Permanent Under-Secretary of the Foreign
Office to review plans for accelerating intelligence. GCHQ was
given a large tranche of new money over five years under the
heading 'Methods to Improve'. Its extensive shopping list
included larger computers and 'high speed analytical equipment'
for renewed attacks on high-grade Soviet communications.
These were given the highest priority, and government
research and supply elements were instructed accordingly.
GCHQ and the Admiralty were beginning a new programme
to build better receivers for ground-based and seaborne
'Technical Search Operations' which were critical to elint. Again,
much of this was about targeting, and the Chiefs of Staff continually
reiterated the 'very great importance' of speeding up technical
development in these areas. 4 ! By November 1952, British
defence chiefs wanted increased expenditure on intelligence,
and were unanimous that in the short term the emphasis should
be on sigint.42
Late 1952 was an exciting time for GCHQ. Equipped with a