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SHOOTDOWNS, CYPHERS AND SPENDING 223<br />

regions. Inevitably, on intelligence relating to economic matters<br />

there was almost no exchange at all. The Treasury demanded<br />

'more of a carve-up and less overlap'.82<br />

Hampshire's probe of sigint lasted several months, and<br />

included a six-week visit to the sprawling NSA headquarters at<br />

Fort Meade that lasted into January 1963. 83 Here, Hampshire<br />

was briefed on the super-secret plans of NSA to expand sigint<br />

collection using satellites like the highly successful 'Grab'<br />

launched in June 1960. He soon concluded that this was one<br />

road GCHQ could not travel, since the costs of satellite operations<br />

were prohibitive. 84 This also reflected his worries about<br />

poor scientific recruitment at GCHQ. 85 His work gave him insights<br />

into some of the most secret activities of MI5 and SIS. He met<br />

the MI5 officer Peter Wright to discuss GCHQ support for scientific<br />

efforts to locate the radios of KGB agents in Britain.<br />

Hampshire was broadly supportive of this, but wished to wind<br />

up 'Airborne Rafter', the element of the operation conducted<br />

with the help of the RAP's 51 Squadron, which was proving<br />

very expensive. Wright, a zealous counter-espionage enthusiast,<br />

resisted, but eventually agreed with Hampshire that the flights<br />

were not cost-effective. 86<br />

Remarkably, after much debate GCHQ got its money. After<br />

1962, the budgets of most of Britain's overseas departments<br />

went down by 10 per cent, but the sigint budget went up by<br />

the same amount. This was an astonishing victory delivered by<br />

Clive Loehnis and his deputy Joe Hooper. They were greatly<br />

helped by the fact that Burke Trend, a fan of secret service,<br />

moved from the Treasury to replace Norman Brook as Cabinet<br />

Secretary in 1963. Trend and Hampshire had eventually<br />

concluded that asking 'value for money' questions about intelligence<br />

warning of a future Soviet attack, or indeed about what<br />

was now a key element of the Anglo-American relationship,<br />

was perhaps wrongheaded. These were core activities that Britain<br />

had to continueY The Treasury's biggest worry was airborne<br />

sigint, which, as we shall see, remained a perennial problem<br />

for decades to come. 88

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