03.01.2015 Views

l4sfdrx

l4sfdrx

l4sfdrx

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

280 TURBULENCE AND TERROR<br />

information, which had probably not been passed to us<br />

over intelligence channels, was of peculiar delicacy.7<br />

*<br />

Although Kissinger felt the 'intercept was insufficient evidence<br />

to form a judgement on Soviet intention', he was clearly excited.<br />

At the same time, his powerful realist instincts pushed him<br />

towards the view that greater military pressure on Hanoi over<br />

the coming months would make the North Vietnamese more<br />

responsive at the negotiating table. s<br />

Kissinger's conflicting thoughts about the Firyubin intercept<br />

underlined the limitations of Western sigint in the early 1970s.<br />

Sigint - and indeed imagery - was delivering fabulous information<br />

on Soviet technical and military activity. Supplemented<br />

by widespread bugging, it also offered superb insights into diplomatic<br />

exchanges at conferences outside Russia, when diplomats<br />

were vulnerable to short-range interception. The British had,<br />

for example, achieved excellent coverage of Alexei Kosygin, the<br />

Soviet Premier, during his recent stay at Claridge's Hotel in<br />

London. 9 Sigint was especially valuable against the leadership<br />

of North Vietnam, and offered useful insights into negotiations<br />

with Hanoi during the late 1960s and early 1970s. Yet the innermost<br />

thoughts of the Moscow leadership remained elusive. More<br />

than two decades after Black Friday, Soviet high-level diplomatic<br />

communications remained largely unreadable.<br />

Indiscretions by Soviet diplomats like Nikolay Firyubin on their<br />

travels offered only a fleeting glimpse of the thinking of the<br />

Politburo. 1O<br />

Some joint Anglo-American intelligence operations were<br />

attempting to lift the corner of this veil of secrecy. There had<br />

been considerable success in intercepting Soviet government<br />

telephone calls, which were carried by microwave relay systems.<br />

Much of this material was acquired at short range by technical<br />

teams in the British and American Embassies in Moscow. The<br />

British operation was code-named 'Tryst', and the American<br />

was 'Broadside'. In 1972 the Canadians joined them with their<br />

own sigint operation, 'Stephanie'. However, American journal-

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!