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NOTES TO PAGES 242-255 589
44 'Report of the CESD Working Party',
13.05.69, DEFE 32118.
45 Gardiner (CESD) to Cottrell (MoD),
13.11.68, CAB 164/312.
46 Benjamin, Five Lives in One, pp.143-5.
47 'Report of the CESD Workin!! Party',
13.05.69, DE FE 32118.
48 Burroughs (FCO) to Ryland (GPO),
'Future of CESD', 3.06.69, ibid.
49 Creevy, 'A Critical Review', p.212.
50 Young, The Labour Governments, 1964-70,
pp.I4-15; Johnson, American Cryptology,
Vol.2, pp.458-9
51 Taylor (USN) to Wenger (NSA), 28.06.68,
Box 104, CNSG records, RG 38, NARA.
Chapter 13: Intelligence for Doomsday
1 Reproduced in Goodman, The Dog that
Didn't Bark', pp.529-51
2 Friedman, The Fifty-Year War, p.351.
3 Aid, Secret Sentry, p.144.
4 Le Bailly, The Development of the
Defence Intelligence Staf[: Staff II, 1970-
1973', Folder 6, Box 7, Le Bailly papers,
CCe.
5 Le Bailly to Butler (Cab Sec), 09.12.93,
Folder 5, Box 21, ibid. See also Butler (Cab
Sec) to Le Bailly, 14.12.93, ibid.
6 Cradock, Know Your Enemy, pp.249-56;
also private information. The Americans
had realised that the invasion was on by
midday on 19 August. Johason, American
Cryptology, Vol.2, pp.458-9.
7 Le Bailly to 'Charlie', 01.07.82, Folder 3,
Box 7, Le Bailly papers, CCC. See also Aid,
Secret Sentry, pp.142-6; Cradock, Know
Your Enemy, pp.241-58.
8 DMO memo, 'Future Requirement for SAS
Type Operations', 14.07.58, WO 32/19472.
See also memo by Lt Col. Pat Hart, The
Spedal Air Service', 1958, McLeod papers,
2/5, LHCMA.
9 257 Signals Squadron provided the
communications links from Northag HQ
to UK and German missile batteries.
10 Private information.
11 'Operational Directive to 23 SAS and
Special Reconnaissance Squadron RAG',
Annex to B 2014110 G (Ops and Plans)
11.09.62, WO 32/19472.
12 Garner, Codename Copperhead, pp.19-25.
13 NATO Special Committee - Nuclear
Planning Working Group: Role of Tactical
Nuclear Weapons (paper by the UK),
12.04.66, CAB 163/38.
14 AWRE Report 012173, 'Clipeus Reference
Documents and the UK ADM Policy 1953-
1971', ES411372.
15 DOAE M7404, 'Exercise Badger's Lair: The
Detectability of Stay-Behind Parties',
06.74, DEFE 48/279.
16 LCSC (61) 17 (Final), ' "Short Burst"
Radio Communications Systems',
31.12.61, CAB 2114601.
17 DOAE M7424, 'An Assessment of the Value
to I(BR) Corps of ESM Provided by 225
Signal Squadron', 01.75, DEFE 48/294.
18 Ibid.
19 What Northag lacked was a local equivalent
of the American Guardrail system.
Stacy, US Army Border Operations in
Germany, 1945-1983, p.243.
20 Pocock, The U-2 Spyplane, p.81. I am
indebted to Chris Pocock for his comments
on U-2 sigint systems.
21 DOAE Study No 229, 'The
Communications Electronic Support
Measures Provided by 225 Signal
Squadron to I (BR) Corps in War', 10.75,
DEFE 48/806.
22 DOAE Project 147, The NATO Intelligence
System', 06.69, DEFE 48/496.
23 'Experiments on the Use of Information
Gained from Remote Sensors on the
Battlefield', 1976, DEFE 48/318; Nicholls,
'Unattended Ground Sensors', pp.6-11.
Also private information.
24 2ATAF was comprised of squadrons from
the Belgian, Netherlands, German and
Royal Air Forces.
25 DOAE Project 147, 'The NATO Intelligence
System', 06.69, DEFE 48/496.
26 JSP 120 (5), Manual of Service Intelligence
Volume 5: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Standardization Agreements (Stanags)
Intelligence, 11.73, DEFE 73112.
27 Johnson, American Cryptology, Vol.2, p.332.
28 Deletant, Ceausescu and the Securitate, p.55.
29 Burrough (UK FCO) to Stewart (Secretary
UK JIC (A)), 'NATO Security - Nahit
Imre', 28.01.69, FCO 411441. See also DPS
1006/22/1169, 'Assessment of Military
Damage Done to the UK as a Result of
the Imre Affair', 01.69, ibid.
30 Bushell (UK NATO Deleg) to Ashe (FCO),
'NATO - Spy Case', 27.09.68, FO 1116/39.
31 Burrough (UK FCO) to Burrows (UK Rep
NAC), EJC 10/579/4, 18.02.69, ibid.
32 Pemberton-Pigott (UK NATO Deleg.) to
Burrough (FCO), 07.03.69, ibid.
33 Pemberton-Piggot (UK NATO Deleg.) to
Holmer (FCO), 06.08.69, ibid.
34 Frank Cooper (UK MoD) to Bernard
Burrows (UK Rep NAC), DSS (P)I7779,
The Roussilhe Case', 21.11.69,
FOIl 16/40.