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472 GCHQ GOES GLOBAL<br />

friendly with the Bosnian Serb headquarters at Pale, where SIS<br />

undoubtedly enjoyed good sources of intelligence. Along with<br />

the secret services of Greece and the Ukraine, Mossad was openly<br />

pro-Serbian, and was concerned by the CIA's close cooperation<br />

with Turkey and Iran in a covert operation to fly in arms and<br />

jihadist fighters from the Middle East to bolster the Muslim cause,<br />

in clear contravention of the United Nations arms embargo. The<br />

former Yugoslavia also offered some fascinating lessons in the<br />

tortuous politics of allied signals intelligence. 2o<br />

Bosnia was a place where relations between GCHQ and NSA<br />

were tense. Intelligence sharing between the two allies on the<br />

Balkans was limited, and NSA was very reluctant to provide its<br />

British partner with any intelligence on the Muslim factions<br />

that were favoured by Washington. Meanwhile, General Sir<br />

Michael Rose, a former head of the SAS and now the British<br />

Commander in Chief of the United Nations Protection Force,<br />

found that his biggest problem was the insecure and elderly<br />

communications equipment that the British Army had endured<br />

for years. The need for better radios had been one of the obvious<br />

lessons from the Falklands, but Britain's defence bureaucrats<br />

had bungled hopelessly. Rose realised that his UN headquarters<br />

in Sarajevo were effectively under surveillance by the Americans.<br />

He himself was regarded as a 'legitimate target' for sigint collection<br />

by the USA, since he was officially serving as a UN military<br />

chief, rather than as a British commanderY<br />

NSA worked closely with the German BND to offer sigint<br />

support to the various Muslim elements, not least to Croatia,<br />

which had suffered badly at the hands of the Serbs in the fighting<br />

of 1991 and 1992. They focused on boosting the work of Admiral<br />

Davor Domazet, chief of Croatia's military intelligence during<br />

the struggle against secessionist Serbian guerrillas in the east of<br />

the country. This was especially visible during 1993, when<br />

Croatian forces pushed forward into the Medak Pocket, and<br />

again in August 1995, when they conducted a lightning offensive<br />

known as 'Operation Storm'. This was supported by<br />

unmanned intelligence-gathering drones which allowed

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