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530 GCHQ GOES GLOBAL<br />

Division Chief, who worked closely with Britain's SIS, has<br />

revealed that Naji Sabri, Iraq's Foreign Minister, did a deal to<br />

reveal the country's military secrets. Drumheller recounts that<br />

once policy-makers learned what Sabri had to say - that Iraq<br />

had no active WMD programme - 'They stopped being interested<br />

in the intelligence.'71<br />

There was also blatant political dishonesty. The British government<br />

had made three assertions in its WMD dossier. First, that<br />

there was plausible intelligence to suggest that the Iraqis might<br />

have hidden some old biological or chemical stocks from 1991.<br />

This was true, but these weapons were unlikely to be usable,<br />

and were at best of historical interest. Second, that there was<br />

evidence that Iraq continued to seek nuclear components on<br />

the world market, and nurtured future ambitions. This was also<br />

true, but no one thought for a moment that the country had<br />

got far with reconstituting its nuclear programme. Everything<br />

turned on the third claim, that Iraq was engaged in continued<br />

production of WMD. This assertion was made forcibly by the<br />

Prime Minister in his personal foreword to the Iraqi WMD dossier<br />

in September 2002. There was no credible evidence for this.72<br />

Later, Blair assured the House of Commons that the intelligence<br />

was 'extensive, detailed, authoritative'. This statement was also<br />

deeply misleading. 73 Equally, Butler noticed that there was no<br />

change in the intelligence reports on Iraqi WMD during the<br />

period between 2002 and 2003, when the British government<br />

shifted dramatically from a policy of containing Iraq to one of<br />

confrontation. 74 Alastair Campbell summed this up best in his<br />

diary, noting that the hardest question was: 'Why now What<br />

was it that we knew now that we didn't before that made us<br />

believe that we had to do it now'75<br />

In one respect, Lord Butler's report was odd. As we have<br />

seen, GCHQ produces the majority of Britain's intelligence.<br />

Astonishingly, in the 216 pages of the report 'GCHQ' appears<br />

only once, and that is in the list of abbreviations. It seems that<br />

Cheltenham was referred to in the text of an earlier draft, but<br />

in the published version all discussion of it has mysteriously

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