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Critical Thinking and Intelligence Analysis

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analytic populations. 182<br />

Stanley Feder recounts how a tipping point<br />

began to apply to a political analysis method at the CIA in the 1970s<br />

<strong>and</strong> 1980s. The method involved two estimative tools known as<br />

Factions <strong>and</strong> Policon that were used by the “<strong>Intelligence</strong> Directorate<br />

<strong>and</strong> the National <strong>Intelligence</strong> Council’s <strong>Analysis</strong> Group to analyze<br />

scores of policy <strong>and</strong> instability issues in over 30 countries.” 183<br />

The<br />

reasons for the adoption of these tools remain the same: “Forecasts<br />

<strong>and</strong> analyses…have proved to be significantly more precise <strong>and</strong><br />

detailed than traditional analyses.” 184<br />

Writing about the method in<br />

1987, Feder predicted that its use would continue to exp<strong>and</strong>. 185 The<br />

method is still in use 19 years after Feder’s article was published.<br />

However, exp<strong>and</strong>ed use failed – perhaps because the tool was on a<br />

computer platform that ceased to be supported by the Agency. The<br />

recent transfer of the tool to a new suite of programs corresponds<br />

with observations that its use is once again exp<strong>and</strong>ing. 186<br />

Non-intelligence-related transformational stories can be applied<br />

in the <strong>Intelligence</strong> Community to facilitate the spread of new ways<br />

182 Malcolm Gladwell, The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can Make a Big<br />

Difference (Boston, MA: Little Brown <strong>and</strong> Company, 2000), 15–29. Gladwell shows<br />

how “social epidemics” can infect a variety of domains.<br />

183 Stanley Feder, “Factions <strong>and</strong> Policon: New Ways to Analyze Politics,”<br />

in H. Bradford Westerfield, ed., Inside CIA’s Private World: Declassified Articles from the<br />

Agency’s Internal Journal, 1955–1992 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995),<br />

275. Cited hereafter as Feder, “Factions <strong>and</strong> Policon.”<br />

184 Feder, “Factions <strong>and</strong> Policon,” 292.<br />

185 Feder, “Factions <strong>and</strong> Policon,” 292. Feder was wrong about its sustained<br />

popular growth.<br />

186 This story is not an isolated instance. In the author’s experience, initial<br />

implementation <strong>and</strong> popularization are often followed by a gradually reduced<br />

user-base. Certain organizations find the tools useful <strong>and</strong> they tend to continue<br />

to use them even though any underlying technology may be obsolete. In the<br />

case of Factions <strong>and</strong> Policon, the tools were maintained on an aged Macintosh<br />

computer. They were updated in 2006 as part of the work of an intelligence<br />

research firm in New Mexico. The Factions tool was rewritten <strong>and</strong> included in<br />

L<strong>and</strong>scape Decision®, a suite of modeling <strong>and</strong> simulation tools developed under<br />

a research contract with the Department of Defense’s Advanced Research <strong>and</strong><br />

Development Activity (ARDA). The updated technology was reinserted into the<br />

tasking organization. Other technology transfers are pending.<br />

– 76 –

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