Critical Thinking and Intelligence Analysis

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TESTIMONIAL: APPLYING CRITICAL THINKING This is a true story. All the characters are real and really naive. As a fresh graduate of NSA’s critical thinking and structured analysis class, I attended an Intelligence Community class on counterintelligence. My fellow students included folks from all over the community, including CIA and FBI case officers. During the class, the instructor put forth a case study for students to think about and decide how best to “analyze and investigate” to find the mole. Differing opinions surfaced, but a common thread appeared among the case officers: follow your “gut” feeling and collect evidence to support that assumption, no matter how long it took. The instructor, enjoying the collective mindset and the opportunity to shatter paradigms, concentrated on how information was collected and analyzed. Again, the case officers agreed the best solution was to continue gathering information until you “proved your case.” I, the lone NSA token student, raised my objection, “How long is long enough Until you’ve ruined the career of innocent, hardworking persons in the IC, or until you find another answer you like” Although it did not earn me friends, it did open up a window to inform these case officers and other attendees about the intricacies of analysis. Critical thinking is not just about putting information together, finding a pattern, then choosing an answer, it is about reducing bias, considering all options available, and presenting options to a decision–maker. And critical thinking is about paying attention to what and how you are doing it. I reasoned that, since the investigators in the case study concentrated on only one Source: A mid–level intelligence professional at the National Security Agency from the evidence. At their most basic level, these inferences depend on credibility (can it be believed), relevance (does the evidence bear on the issue), and inferential or probative force (how compelling is it in answering the questions raised by the issue). Unfortunately, no mass or body of evidence – in intelligence or anywhere else – comes with these three properties already established. Establishment of these properties to abet uncertainty reduction through inference occurs only through a process of argument, creative hypothesis generation, and the development of chains of reasoning. Authenticity, accuracy, and reliability represent criteria for establishing the credibility of tangible evidence. 128 An analyst striving 128 “Tangible evidence” is a technical term describing things that bear relevance to an issue under scrutiny. It is contrasted with “testimonial evidence” – 52 –
person, the analysis was faulty because somewhere along the line they limited their suspects (introduced bias) regardless of reason (access, family connections, angel–like qualities, etc.). Although it would take time, the investigators should conduct quantitative and qualitative analysis, make a decision tree (options open to a mole in a heavy security environment), and then play Devil’s Advocate. In addition, analysis never reveals one “solution” or “smoking gun”; it leads to two or three “options” which can be investigated in detail. The instructor, pleased that someone in the class knew what the “Analysis of Competing Hypotheses” was, revealed the answers of the real–life case study: after three years of investigating, the case officers had the wrong person due to incorrect information in old reports and limiting their suspect list. Instead of going back to the original source information, the officers read old reports that were unfortunately biased by Agency politics and external societal events (1950–60s). The real mole was discovered over a decade later; he was the son of a former Agency chief, well educated and well liked, but did not have access to the information. The individual “borrowed” interesting reports from friends who had access, covered his tracks, and continued spying against the U.S. for several years. Just as the authorities were about to arrest him, he was found dead in a hotel room from a reported suicide, but the cops could not figure out how he had two bullets in his chest and one in the back of his head. Miracle suicide. What is the moral of the story Conduct a thorough analysis right the first time and you can catch a mole anytime. I only hope the attending case officers got the message, especially from a non–gun toting NSA analyst. who wishes to remain anonymous, email to the author, 9 March 2006. to determine authenticity may ask, “Is the evidence what it seems to be” In determining accuracy, the key question is whether the piece of evidence or the system that produced it has the resolution to reveal what the analyst believes the event or record should reveal. Assessing reliability involves determining whether different means of collection produce the same results. If, on the other hand, the evidence is testimonial, different criteria apply. The first thing to be established is whether the source is being truthful. Truthfulness is not absolute. Rather, it is time- and contextdependent. A source may believe he is being truthful about an issue or may have legitimate reasons to be untruthful about that issue. In – what people say about the issue. – 53 –
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The National Defense Intelligence C
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Contents Figures and Tables........
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Figures and Tables Figure 1: A Comp
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As one would expect, the Intelligen
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quality by looking at the products
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Commentary Francis J. Hughes Profes
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That said, clever defense lawyers o
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Robert Heibel, Mercyhurst College;
Page 25 and 26: CRITICAL THINKING AND INTELLIGENCE
Page 27 and 28: CRITICAL THINKING AND INTELLIGENCE
Page 29 and 30: Figure 1 models analysts’ thinkin
Page 31 and 32: ecome better critical thinkers will
Page 33 and 34: - and consequences - things that do
Page 35 and 36: approach ensures that a topic or is
Page 37 and 38: Skill-Based Definitions Other appro
Page 39 and 40: A Disposition to Think Critically I
Page 41 and 42: The Role of Questions Greg Treverto
Page 43 and 44: problem solving and structured meth
Page 45 and 46: In fact, the Soviets were able to d
Page 47 and 48: It should be noted that the U.S. In
Page 49 and 50: thwarted What can be learned to adv
Page 51 and 52: Purpose · Determine what is going
Page 53 and 54: critical thinking could moderate th
Page 55 and 56: Cuba” that led to the tasking of
Page 57 and 58: A missile-launching complex is not
Page 59 and 60: (mapping), evaluate and adapt the i
Page 61 and 62: Winners and Losers: The Crisis in C
Page 63 and 64: as seen from Khrushchev’s Point o
Page 65 and 66: the Soviet Union’s communist agen
Page 67 and 68: supporting forces, an escalation of
Page 69 and 70: in the hands of the West. If, as Al
Page 71 and 72: most recent failure. Critical think
Page 73 and 74: was not enough. 117 Biases and mind
Page 75: asked, as they realized they had no
Page 79 and 80: undermines or supports the particul
Page 81 and 82: to meet short deadlines. However, a
Page 83 and 84: the FBI investigated a pond in west
Page 85 and 86: How can Analysts be Taught to Think
Page 87 and 88: young analysts were unable to do so
Page 89 and 90: it out on their own, encouraged by
Page 91 and 92: instructional models offer compleme
Page 93 and 94: Another means of critical thinking
Page 95 and 96: time constraints, multiple versions
Page 97 and 98: they were required to examine. 173
Page 99 and 100: As Denning points out, these strate
Page 101 and 102: of thinking. For example, two video
Page 103 and 104: intelligence agencies. 191 This was
Page 105 and 106: thinking, however, by providing str
Page 107 and 108: Cooper’s Analytic Pathology Negle
Page 109 and 110: substantially better judgments abou
Page 111 and 112: item limit is easily extended: peop
Page 113 and 114: Finally, it may be a fallacy that c
Page 115 and 116: partnerships between analysts and t
Page 117 and 118: 1990s and 2000s Emergence of comple
Page 119 and 120: Conclusion Never before in our peac
Page 121 and 122: Appendix NSA’s Critical Thinking
Page 123 and 124: Administration: Enrollment: Up to 2
Page 125 and 126: against which to apply/illustrate w
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mindsets impact analysis. • Defin
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• Describe what is needed to move
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Class 4 - Causes, Squares, and Shru
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Class 6 - Testing the Devil’s and
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Class 8 - And Now for Something Com
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Class 10 - Final Project Presentati
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Final Project Evaluation Worksheet
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Bibliography Ackerman, Robert K.
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Cheikes, Brant A., Mark J. Brown, P
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__________. Building Airplanes in F
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Grabo, Cynthia M. Anticipating Surp
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Kerbel, Josh. “Thinking Straight:
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Miller, Judith. “A Battle of Word
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Paul, Richard W., Linda Elder, and
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Stefik, Mark, and Barbara Stefik. B
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About the Author David T. Moore is
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