Critical Thinking and Intelligence Analysis

More documents

Recommendations

Info

Figure 7: Detail of a U-2 Photograph of an SS-4 MRBM Launch Site, San Cristobal, Cuba, 14 October 1962. This evidence confirmed that Soviet missiles were being installed in Cuba. Source: U.S. Department of Defense, photograph in the John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library, Boston, MA, PX 66–20:7 14 October 1962. What tipped off the overhead surveillance were two HUMINT reports of “a Soviet truck convoy that appeared to be towing ballistic missiles toward the San Cristobal area.” 69 That these reports were taken seriously is one of the curious serendipities that occur from time to time in intelligence analysis (and other research-based domains). What prompted the CIA and DIA analysts to take these reports seriously while earlier accounts had been dismissed remains a mystery. Garthoff asserts that it was new information taken in context with the observed “pattern of SA-2 surface-to-air missile sites in Western 69 Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2 nd Edition (New York, NY: Longman, 1999), 220. Cited hereafter as Allison and Zelikow, Essence of Decision. Raymond Garthoff also notes this to be the case. See Garthoff, “US Intelligence,” 23. – 30 –
Cuba” that led to the tasking of the U-2 flight on 14 October (the track of which is shown in figure 8). 70 Also contributing to the determination that the deployed missiles were SS-4 MRBMs was information transmitted to the British and American intelligence services by Oleg Penkovsky. While Penkovsky’s espionage apparently did not warn the Americans that the Soviets were about to deploy offensive missiles in Cuba, he is credited with – among other things – providing technical information about the missiles. 71 Len Scott observes that Penkovsky provided the technical information that allowed the determination that the missiles were SS-4s instead of SS-3s, as well as information that allowed accurate assessment by the Americans of their readiness. Scott writes that this was important because the SS-3 had a range which US intelligence estimated at 630 nautical miles (nm), enabling coverage of seven Strategic Air Command (SAC) bomber/tanker bases; the 1020nm SS‐4 could target 18 bomber/tanker bases (plus one ICBM complex), and some 58 cities with a population of over 100,000, including Washington, accounting for 92 million people. 72 Shortly thereafter Penkovsky was detected, arrested, tried, and executed by the Soviets for his espionage. 70 Garthoff, “US Intelligence,” 23. 71 Len Scott, “Espionage and the Cold War: Oleg Penkovsky and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” Intelligence and National Security 14, no. 3 (Autumn 1999), 33. Cited hereafter as Scott, “Penkovsky.” 72 Scott, “Penkovsky,” 34. In making this assertion Scott draws on work previously published by Allison and Zelikow in Essence of Decision and by Mary S. McAuliffe, ed., CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962 (Washington DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 1992). – 31 –
Page 2 and 3:
The National Defense Intelligence C
Page 5 and 6: Contents Figures and Tables........
Page 7: Figures and Tables Figure 1: A Comp
Page 10 and 11: - viii -
Page 12 and 13: As one would expect, the Intelligen
Page 14 and 15: - xii -
Page 16 and 17: quality by looking at the products
Page 18 and 19: Commentary Francis J. Hughes Profes
Page 20 and 21: That said, clever defense lawyers o
Page 22 and 23: Robert Heibel, Mercyhurst College;
Page 25 and 26: CRITICAL THINKING AND INTELLIGENCE
Page 27 and 28: CRITICAL THINKING AND INTELLIGENCE
Page 29 and 30: Figure 1 models analysts’ thinkin
Page 31 and 32: ecome better critical thinkers will
Page 33 and 34: - and consequences - things that do
Page 35 and 36: approach ensures that a topic or is
Page 37 and 38: Skill-Based Definitions Other appro
Page 39 and 40: A Disposition to Think Critically I
Page 41 and 42: The Role of Questions Greg Treverto
Page 43 and 44: problem solving and structured meth
Page 45 and 46: In fact, the Soviets were able to d
Page 47 and 48: It should be noted that the U.S. In
Page 49 and 50: thwarted What can be learned to adv
Page 51 and 52: Purpose · Determine what is going
Page 53: critical thinking could moderate th
Page 57 and 58: A missile-launching complex is not
Page 59 and 60: (mapping), evaluate and adapt the i
Page 61 and 62: Winners and Losers: The Crisis in C
Page 63 and 64: as seen from Khrushchev’s Point o
Page 65 and 66: the Soviet Union’s communist agen
Page 67 and 68: supporting forces, an escalation of
Page 69 and 70: in the hands of the West. If, as Al
Page 71 and 72: most recent failure. Critical think
Page 73 and 74: was not enough. 117 Biases and mind
Page 75 and 76: asked, as they realized they had no
Page 77 and 78: person, the analysis was faulty bec
Page 79 and 80: undermines or supports the particul
Page 81 and 82: to meet short deadlines. However, a
Page 83 and 84: the FBI investigated a pond in west
Page 85 and 86: How can Analysts be Taught to Think
Page 87 and 88: young analysts were unable to do so
Page 89 and 90: it out on their own, encouraged by
Page 91 and 92: instructional models offer compleme
Page 93 and 94: Another means of critical thinking
Page 95 and 96: time constraints, multiple versions
Page 97 and 98: they were required to examine. 173
Page 99 and 100: As Denning points out, these strate
Page 101 and 102: of thinking. For example, two video
Page 103 and 104: intelligence agencies. 191 This was
Page 105 and 106:
thinking, however, by providing str
Page 107 and 108:
Cooper’s Analytic Pathology Negle
Page 109 and 110:
substantially better judgments abou
Page 111 and 112:
item limit is easily extended: peop
Page 113 and 114:
Finally, it may be a fallacy that c
Page 115 and 116:
partnerships between analysts and t
Page 117 and 118:
1990s and 2000s Emergence of comple
Page 119 and 120:
Conclusion Never before in our peac
Page 121 and 122:
Appendix NSA’s Critical Thinking
Page 123 and 124:
Administration: Enrollment: Up to 2
Page 125 and 126:
against which to apply/illustrate w
Page 127 and 128:
mindsets impact analysis. • Defin
Page 129 and 130:
• Describe what is needed to move
Page 131 and 132:
Class 4 - Causes, Squares, and Shru
Page 133 and 134:
Class 6 - Testing the Devil’s and
Page 135 and 136:
Class 8 - And Now for Something Com
Page 137 and 138:
Class 10 - Final Project Presentati
Page 139 and 140:
Final Project Evaluation Worksheet
Page 141 and 142:
Bibliography Ackerman, Robert K.
Page 143 and 144:
Cheikes, Brant A., Mark J. Brown, P
Page 145 and 146:
__________. Building Airplanes in F
Page 147 and 148:
Grabo, Cynthia M. Anticipating Surp
Page 149 and 150:
Kerbel, Josh. “Thinking Straight:
Page 151 and 152:
Miller, Judith. “A Battle of Word
Page 153 and 154:
Paul, Richard W., Linda Elder, and
Page 155 and 156:
Stefik, Mark, and Barbara Stefik. B
Page 157 and 158:
About the Author David T. Moore is
show all

Critical Thinking and Intelligence Analysis

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?