Critical Thinking and Intelligence Analysis

ases was not a satisfactory option. 88
Kennedy’s advisers, acting as
analysts of the situation, critically evaluated the appropriateness of
the analogy, pointing out its weaknesses and strengths. Kennedy
concluded that sneak attacks were not a tactic lying within the U.S.
tradition. 89
In the Cuban case, getting analysts to restate their conclusions,
provide examples, and make analogies would have revealed the
strengths and weaknesses of their arguments about what they
observed from the HUMINT sources. It would have shown their
comprehension of what they wanted to conclude, revealed their
assumptions and, in so doing, opened an avenue for “alternative”
assessments of the issue. It would have done so by causing the analysts
to question how it was that they failed to notice or ignore things. 90
The stage would have been set for an earlier, less risky, defusing of
the impending crisis.
Another analogy employed in the Cuban missile crisis was the
comparison to the Soviet position vis-à-vis the presence of American
MRBMs in Turkey. A critical review reveals that the Soviet Union had
tolerated the presence of these missiles – which had a longer range
than those placed in Cuba – since 1957. 91
If the U.S. demanded
the removal of the Soviet missiles from Cuba, was not a similar
withdrawal of the American missiles from Turkey appropriate
Ultimately, this analogy provided a face-saving solution for the
Soviet Union in the negotiations that followed. As a “secret” part
of the agreement, the American Jupiter MRBMs were removed from
Turkey five months after the Soviet Union removed its missiles from
Cuba. 92
88 Neustadt and May, Thinking in Time, 6.
89 Neustadt and May, Thinking in Time, 7.
90 Margaret A. Boden, The Creative Mind: Myths and Mechanisms (New York,
NY: Basic Books, 1990), 25.
91 Neustadt and May, Thinking in Time, 9.
92 Neustadt and May, Thinking in Time, 15.
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