Critical Thinking and Intelligence Analysis

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What Can Be Learned from the Past Thinking Critically about Cuba Examining past intelligence successes and failures in light of new developments provides a means to reassess what happened and how outcomes could have been different. The case of the Soviet missiles in Cuba in the summer and fall of 1962 provides a means of examining how critical thinking and structured methodologies could have made a difference. Deploying the Missiles During the summer of 1962, CIA analysts received a spate of potentially alarming reports about Russians being seen in Cuba. The reports, however, were only part of a stream of similar, “farfetched tales of African troops with rings in their noses, lurking Mongolians, and even Chinese troops” on the island. 38 Most or all of these reports were discounted by analysts who were inured to spurious reports of Soviet equipment secreted away in caves. 39 James Hansen – who worked in both the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) – posits that the U.S. Intelligence and Policy Communities were the victims of a concerted Soviet campaign of denial and deception that masked the deployment of Soviet forces and missiles into Cuba. 40 The deception campaign even included “accurate information about the deployment [leaked] so as to mask it.” 41 As Raymond Garthoff relates, “there were literally thousands of reports of missiles in Cuba in the period before any missiles were actually brought there.” 42 38 James H. Hansen, “Soviet Deception in the Cuban Missile Crisis,” Studies in Intelligence 46, no. 1 (2002), 56. Cited hereafter as Hansen, “Soviet Deception.” 39 Hansen, “Soviet Deception,” 56. 40 Hansen, “Soviet Deception,” 49–58. 41 Domingo Amuchastegui, “Cuban Intelligence and the October Crisis,” in James G. Blight and David A. Welch, Eds., Intelligence and the Cuban Missile Crisis (London, UK: Frank Cass, 1998), 101. 42 Raymond L. Garthoff, “US Intelligence in the Cuban Missile Crisis,” in – 20 –
In fact, the Soviets were able to deploy more than the offensive nuclear missiles that became the centerpiece of the subsequent crisis with the United States. While U.S. analysts and policymakers knew of the conventional weapons, they were blind to the presence of SS- 4 Medium Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBM) and SS-5 Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles prior to the U-2 overflights of 14 October. Additionally, it seems they never discovered the presence of approximately 100 tactical nuclear weapons deployed on the island. 43 There is debate whether U.S. Intelligence also underestimated the number of Soviet troops deployed to Cuba. Garthoff reports that one CIA unit concluded there were between 45,000 and 50,000 Soviet troops in Cuba (the actual number was about 42,000) but the official estimate was between 4,500 and 5,000 prior to the crisis. 44 The Soviets employed an elaborate campaign of denial and deception that took advantage of American points of view about the likelihood of Soviet weapons being located in Cuba. As Robert Jervis makes clear, the U.S. did not expect the Russians to put missiles into Cuba or Japan to attack Pearl Harbor because American officials knew that the U.S. would thwart these measures if they were taken. These judgments were correct, but because other countries saw the world and the U.S. less accurately, the American predictions were inaccurate. 45 It could have been worse. As Gil Merom writes, the Soviets might James G. Blight and David A. Welch, Eds., Intelligence and the Cuban Missile Crisis (London, UK: Frank Cass, 1998), 22. Emphasis in original. Cited hereafter as Garthoff, “US Intelligence.” 43 Garthoff, “US Intelligence,” 29. 44 Garthoff, “US Intelligence,” 28, 58. U.S. Intelligence never did reach a correct conclusion. The closest they got was an estimate of 22,000 troops in early 1963 (Garthoff, “U.S. Intelligence,” 28). 45 Robert Jervis, System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), 45. Jervis draws on the work of Klaus Knorr. See Klaus Knorr, “Failures in National Intelligence Estimates: The Case of the Cuban Missiles,” World Politics 16 (April 1964): 455–67. – 21 –
Page 2 and 3: The National Defense Intelligence C
Page 5 and 6: Contents Figures and Tables........
Page 7: Figures and Tables Figure 1: A Comp
Page 10 and 11: - viii -
Page 12 and 13: As one would expect, the Intelligen
Page 14 and 15: - xii -
Page 16 and 17: quality by looking at the products
Page 18 and 19: Commentary Francis J. Hughes Profes
Page 20 and 21: That said, clever defense lawyers o
Page 22 and 23: Robert Heibel, Mercyhurst College;
Page 25 and 26: CRITICAL THINKING AND INTELLIGENCE
Page 27 and 28: CRITICAL THINKING AND INTELLIGENCE
Page 29 and 30: Figure 1 models analysts’ thinkin
Page 31 and 32: ecome better critical thinkers will
Page 33 and 34: - and consequences - things that do
Page 35 and 36: approach ensures that a topic or is
Page 37 and 38: Skill-Based Definitions Other appro
Page 39 and 40: A Disposition to Think Critically I
Page 41 and 42: The Role of Questions Greg Treverto
Page 43: problem solving and structured meth
Page 47 and 48: It should be noted that the U.S. In
Page 49 and 50: thwarted What can be learned to adv
Page 51 and 52: Purpose · Determine what is going
Page 53 and 54: critical thinking could moderate th
Page 55 and 56: Cuba” that led to the tasking of
Page 57 and 58: A missile-launching complex is not
Page 59 and 60: (mapping), evaluate and adapt the i
Page 61 and 62: Winners and Losers: The Crisis in C
Page 63 and 64: as seen from Khrushchev’s Point o
Page 65 and 66: the Soviet Union’s communist agen
Page 67 and 68: supporting forces, an escalation of
Page 69 and 70: in the hands of the West. If, as Al
Page 71 and 72: most recent failure. Critical think
Page 73 and 74: was not enough. 117 Biases and mind
Page 75 and 76: asked, as they realized they had no
Page 77 and 78: person, the analysis was faulty bec
Page 79 and 80: undermines or supports the particul
Page 81 and 82: to meet short deadlines. However, a
Page 83 and 84: the FBI investigated a pond in west
Page 85 and 86: How can Analysts be Taught to Think
Page 87 and 88: young analysts were unable to do so
Page 89 and 90: it out on their own, encouraged by
Page 91 and 92: instructional models offer compleme
Page 93 and 94: Another means of critical thinking
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time constraints, multiple versions
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they were required to examine. 173
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As Denning points out, these strate
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of thinking. For example, two video
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intelligence agencies. 191 This was
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thinking, however, by providing str
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Cooper’s Analytic Pathology Negle
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substantially better judgments abou
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item limit is easily extended: peop
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Finally, it may be a fallacy that c
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partnerships between analysts and t
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1990s and 2000s Emergence of comple
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Conclusion Never before in our peac
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Appendix NSA’s Critical Thinking
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Administration: Enrollment: Up to 2
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against which to apply/illustrate w
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mindsets impact analysis. • Defin
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• Describe what is needed to move
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Class 4 - Causes, Squares, and Shru
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Class 6 - Testing the Devil’s and
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Class 8 - And Now for Something Com
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Class 10 - Final Project Presentati
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Final Project Evaluation Worksheet
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Bibliography Ackerman, Robert K.
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Cheikes, Brant A., Mark J. Brown, P
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__________. Building Airplanes in F
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Grabo, Cynthia M. Anticipating Surp
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Kerbel, Josh. “Thinking Straight:
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Miller, Judith. “A Battle of Word
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Paul, Richard W., Linda Elder, and
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Stefik, Mark, and Barbara Stefik. B
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About the Author David T. Moore is
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