Critical Thinking and Intelligence Analysis

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Figure 8: U–2 Tracks over Cuba, 4–14 October 1962. Sources: Map, Central Intelligence Agency. Tracks derived from a map in Mary S. McAuliffe, ed., CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962 (Washington DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 1992), 3. Hereafter McAuliffe. Missile locations derived from Arthur C. Lundahl, “Additional Information – Mission 3102,” Memorandum for Director of Central Intelligence and Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, 15 October 1962, in McAuliffe, 181–182; and Arthur C. Lundahl, “Additional Information – Mission 3107,” Memorandum for Director of Central Intelligence and Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, 19 October 1962, in McAuliffe, 209. Track and missile locations are approximations. Lundahl was the Director, National Photographic Interpretation Center. The 19 October memo reports that a 5 September U–2 overflight did not detect the latter two missile sites. However, a review of the 5 September track (as presented in McAuliffe) shows the aircraft only came near the Sagua La Grande site. It should also be noted that the track of the U-2 – as flown on 14 October – deviated from the original planned route (which was farther to the west). The track as flown took the aircraft closer to the San Cristobal site. What might have happened had the original track been flown Despite their efforts at denial and deception, there was an evident lack of concealment of the missiles by the Soviets prior to their “discovery” on 14 October. General Anatoli Gribkov, a member of the Soviet General Staff in Cuba at the time relates, – 32 –
A missile–launching complex is not easily disguised…[Such] an installation…could be hidden from ground‐level view. But from above, however, it could and did stick out like a sore thumb. 73 Allison and Zelikow note that the Soviets only began to camouflage the sites after “the U.S. announced the discovery of the missiles and announced the blockade.” 74 They conclude that the Soviet forces building the bases lacked personnel and resources to conceal them – a situation that apparently changed only after the missiles had been discovered. 75 The Roles of Critical Thinking in the Cuban Crisis Merom’s critique of the Intelligence Community’s estimate of Soviet intentions vis-à-vis Soviet weapons in Cuba reveals areas that would be well-served by critical thinking. First, when a critical thinking paradigm is in control, intelligence foraging and gathering are efficiently oriented. Questions are raised about the existing evidence – both anomalous and consistent – as well as where new disconfirming and confirming evidence might be discovered. Second, alternative – what in the context of Cuba, Merom calls revolutionary – theories are considered. 76 A structured process also speeds up the process of analytic sensemaking: estimates are crafted earlier. 77 Third, a methodological process opens analysis to “guiding principles of 73 Anatoli Gribkov, “The View from Moscow and Havana,” in Anatoli Gribkov and William Y. Smith, Operation ANADYR: U.S. and Soviet Generals Recount the Cuban Missile Crisis (Chicago, IL: Edition Q, 1994), 39. Cited hereafter as Gribkov, “The View.” 74 Allison and Zelikow, Essence of Decision, 208. 75 Allison and Zelikow, Essence of Decision, 214. 76 Merom, “Estimate,” 71. 77 Structured processes provide a framework that reduces the flailing around as analysts seek to find a starting point for their analyses. Morgan Jones discusses this at some length. See Jones, Thinker’s Toolkit, xi–xvi. – 33 –
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The National Defense Intelligence C
Page 5 and 6: Contents Figures and Tables........
Page 7: Figures and Tables Figure 1: A Comp
Page 10 and 11: - viii -
Page 12 and 13: As one would expect, the Intelligen
Page 14 and 15: - xii -
Page 16 and 17: quality by looking at the products
Page 18 and 19: Commentary Francis J. Hughes Profes
Page 20 and 21: That said, clever defense lawyers o
Page 22 and 23: Robert Heibel, Mercyhurst College;
Page 25 and 26: CRITICAL THINKING AND INTELLIGENCE
Page 27 and 28: CRITICAL THINKING AND INTELLIGENCE
Page 29 and 30: Figure 1 models analysts’ thinkin
Page 31 and 32: ecome better critical thinkers will
Page 33 and 34: - and consequences - things that do
Page 35 and 36: approach ensures that a topic or is
Page 37 and 38: Skill-Based Definitions Other appro
Page 39 and 40: A Disposition to Think Critically I
Page 41 and 42: The Role of Questions Greg Treverto
Page 43 and 44: problem solving and structured meth
Page 45 and 46: In fact, the Soviets were able to d
Page 47 and 48: It should be noted that the U.S. In
Page 49 and 50: thwarted What can be learned to adv
Page 51 and 52: Purpose · Determine what is going
Page 53 and 54: critical thinking could moderate th
Page 55: Cuba” that led to the tasking of
Page 59 and 60: (mapping), evaluate and adapt the i
Page 61 and 62: Winners and Losers: The Crisis in C
Page 63 and 64: as seen from Khrushchev’s Point o
Page 65 and 66: the Soviet Union’s communist agen
Page 67 and 68: supporting forces, an escalation of
Page 69 and 70: in the hands of the West. If, as Al
Page 71 and 72: most recent failure. Critical think
Page 73 and 74: was not enough. 117 Biases and mind
Page 75 and 76: asked, as they realized they had no
Page 77 and 78: person, the analysis was faulty bec
Page 79 and 80: undermines or supports the particul
Page 81 and 82: to meet short deadlines. However, a
Page 83 and 84: the FBI investigated a pond in west
Page 85 and 86: How can Analysts be Taught to Think
Page 87 and 88: young analysts were unable to do so
Page 89 and 90: it out on their own, encouraged by
Page 91 and 92: instructional models offer compleme
Page 93 and 94: Another means of critical thinking
Page 95 and 96: time constraints, multiple versions
Page 97 and 98: they were required to examine. 173
Page 99 and 100: As Denning points out, these strate
Page 101 and 102: of thinking. For example, two video
Page 103 and 104: intelligence agencies. 191 This was
Page 105 and 106: thinking, however, by providing str
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Cooper’s Analytic Pathology Negle
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substantially better judgments abou
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item limit is easily extended: peop
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Finally, it may be a fallacy that c
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partnerships between analysts and t
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1990s and 2000s Emergence of comple
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Conclusion Never before in our peac
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Appendix NSA’s Critical Thinking
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Administration: Enrollment: Up to 2
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against which to apply/illustrate w
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mindsets impact analysis. • Defin
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• Describe what is needed to move
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Class 4 - Causes, Squares, and Shru
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Class 6 - Testing the Devil’s and
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Class 8 - And Now for Something Com
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Class 10 - Final Project Presentati
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Final Project Evaluation Worksheet
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Bibliography Ackerman, Robert K.
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Cheikes, Brant A., Mark J. Brown, P
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__________. Building Airplanes in F
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Grabo, Cynthia M. Anticipating Surp
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Kerbel, Josh. “Thinking Straight:
Page 151 and 152:
Miller, Judith. “A Battle of Word
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Paul, Richard W., Linda Elder, and
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Stefik, Mark, and Barbara Stefik. B
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About the Author David T. Moore is
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