Critical Thinking and Intelligence Analysis

supporting forces, an escalation of measures to prompt that removal,
and the possibility of conventional or nuclear war. 106
Kennedy had evidence of his political vulnerability He also had
evidence – Khrushchev’s own actions included – that the Soviet
leader was a formidable adversary. But based on Penkovsky’s
evidence he inferred that Khrushchev might be persuaded to back
down. As Scott concludes, “various writers contend that Penkovsky’s
intelligence…[guided] Kennedy’s handling of the crisis from a
position of strength.” 107
This occurred in part because “the KGB’s
discovery of Penkovsky’s espionage alerted Khrushchev to the fact
that Kennedy now knew he was bluffing.” 108
As has been noted,
Kennedy lacked accurate evidence about what was really on the
island. Nevertheless as has been noted, he inferred that military
strikes were not – at least at that time – an option. Kennedy probably
relied on the same concepts on which Castro and Khrushchev relied.
In addition, the concepts embodied in the Monroe Doctrine were
also probably a factor. Kennedy’s key question was, “How to get
the Soviets and their missiles out of Cuba”
Foresight. Viewed with foresight, there were a number of possible
outcomes to the crisis based on the inferrable goals that could be
associated with any of the three leaders. A win for one of the leaders
was not necessarily a loss for the others as table 4 shows. In some
cases, achieving one’s goal was a win for the leader, but a failure to
achieve it was not necessarily a loss. “Winning” the crisis should have
involved attaining all or most of one’s goals. However, since not all
goals were of equal importance, failing to achieve one could mean
that one lost in the larger crisis. Similarly, achieving one’s goals did
not guarantee winning the larger crisis. This becomes evident as
the actual winners and losers are considered.
106 Neustadt and May, Thinking in Time, 6-15. Given the presence of the
Soviet tactical nuclear weapons on Cuba it is probable that any invasion that began
with conventional forces would have escalated to nuclear scenarios.
107 Scott, “Penkovsky,” 31.
108 Scott, “Penkovsky,” 32.
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