Critical Thinking and Intelligence Analysis

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unaided, his own forces were no match for the U.S. forces. Underlying Castro’s considerations were a number of ideas about military strategy and doctrine, as well as communist and capitalist theories. A corollary consideration commonly believed by many Americans (at the time and still today) might have been how Communism could have been spread across the Western Hemisphere, especially the United States. Castro’s key question was, “How can I prevent the United States from invading again” Khrushchev. What motivated Khrushchev remains controversial. His motives certainly were more complex, as various explanatory hypotheses reflect. First, there is the argument that Khrushchev had an ally “in the faith” to protect. He too believed that the United States would invade Cuba a second time. 95 However, as Allison and Zelikow counsel, the troop buildup itself and not the nuclear missiles was what Khrushchev did to offset the perceived threat to Cuba from the United States. 96 The deployment of the nuclear missiles was related to some other issue. Next, the situation posed an opportunity to force concessions from the United States – perhaps about Berlin, or the United States’ own offensive missiles located in Europe and Turkey. Allison and Zelikow find sufficient evidence to lead them to believe that removing the U.S. and NATO troops from Berlin was a key factor motivating Khrushchev to deploy the missiles to Cuba. 97 Securing his borders from the American’s Jupiter missiles may have been an additional motivating factor. Additionally, there was Khrushchev’s avowed purpose of spreading Communism across the globe. In this context the deployment of weapons lies within the context of “a great power rivalry… between the U.S. and the values and interests it represented…and 95 James J. Wirtz, “Organizing for Crisis Intelligence: Lessons form the Cuban Missile Crisis,” in Blight and Welch, Intelligence and the Cuban Missile Crisis, 130. Cited hereafter as Wirtz, “Organizing.” 96 Allison and Zelikow, Essence of Decision, 87. 97 Allison and Zelikow, Essence of Decision, 99–109. – 40 –
the Soviet Union’s communist agenda.” 98 At a reception for foreign ambassadors in Moscow in 1956, Khrushchev threatened, “Whether you like it or not, history is on our side. We [the communists] will bury you!” 99 This remark (among others) also reveals an additional purpose: Khrushchev, like all dictators, had to appear stronger than his adversaries – his political survival depended on it. Khrushchev’s point of view was that the United States (and its allies) were a threat to Communism everywhere and needed to be contained. He was presented with a confluence of opportunities and responded with the military buildup in Cuba and the deployment of the missiles. He apparently assumed that if he could get nuclear missiles into Cuba he’d have bargaining points useful in such a containment strategy. Later, Khrushchev believed he could effect a change in the balance of power between the two nations. 100 Possible outcomes included the prospect of further U.S. concessions, protection of Cuba from invasion, and either conventional or nuclear war. Khrushchev had direct evidence drawn from the Korean War and possibly other evidence from spies operating in the United States about the capability of the U.S. military. Given the nuclear missiles he actually deployed as well as his assignment (temporary) of operational control of those missiles to the Soviet Group of Forces commander, General Issa Pliyev, Khrushchev seems to have inferred the U.S. forces were formidable. 101 He also apparently concluded that the missiles – and the other forces – would be adequate to the task of successfully satisfying his purposes; the United States, faced with 98 Allison and Zelikow, Essence of Decision, 88. 99 Nikita Khrushchev, “Speech to Ambassadors at Reception, 17 November 1956,” in James Beasley Simpson, compiler, Simpson’s Contemporary Quotations: The most Notable Quotes since 1950 (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1988), online edition, URL: , last accessed 20 April 2006. Ironically, Khrushchev was wrong. History sided with his adversaries. 100 Cited in Garthoff, Reflections, 23. 100 Gribkov, “The View,” 4. Control reverted back to Moscow in September. – 41 –
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The National Defense Intelligence C
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Contents Figures and Tables........
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Figures and Tables Figure 1: A Comp
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- viii -
Page 12 and 13:
As one would expect, the Intelligen
Page 14 and 15: - xii -
Page 16 and 17: quality by looking at the products
Page 18 and 19: Commentary Francis J. Hughes Profes
Page 20 and 21: That said, clever defense lawyers o
Page 22 and 23: Robert Heibel, Mercyhurst College;
Page 25 and 26: CRITICAL THINKING AND INTELLIGENCE
Page 27 and 28: CRITICAL THINKING AND INTELLIGENCE
Page 29 and 30: Figure 1 models analysts’ thinkin
Page 31 and 32: ecome better critical thinkers will
Page 33 and 34: - and consequences - things that do
Page 35 and 36: approach ensures that a topic or is
Page 37 and 38: Skill-Based Definitions Other appro
Page 39 and 40: A Disposition to Think Critically I
Page 41 and 42: The Role of Questions Greg Treverto
Page 43 and 44: problem solving and structured meth
Page 45 and 46: In fact, the Soviets were able to d
Page 47 and 48: It should be noted that the U.S. In
Page 49 and 50: thwarted What can be learned to adv
Page 51 and 52: Purpose · Determine what is going
Page 53 and 54: critical thinking could moderate th
Page 55 and 56: Cuba” that led to the tasking of
Page 57 and 58: A missile-launching complex is not
Page 59 and 60: (mapping), evaluate and adapt the i
Page 61 and 62: Winners and Losers: The Crisis in C
Page 63: as seen from Khrushchev’s Point o
Page 67 and 68: supporting forces, an escalation of
Page 69 and 70: in the hands of the West. If, as Al
Page 71 and 72: most recent failure. Critical think
Page 73 and 74: was not enough. 117 Biases and mind
Page 75 and 76: asked, as they realized they had no
Page 77 and 78: person, the analysis was faulty bec
Page 79 and 80: undermines or supports the particul
Page 81 and 82: to meet short deadlines. However, a
Page 83 and 84: the FBI investigated a pond in west
Page 85 and 86: How can Analysts be Taught to Think
Page 87 and 88: young analysts were unable to do so
Page 89 and 90: it out on their own, encouraged by
Page 91 and 92: instructional models offer compleme
Page 93 and 94: Another means of critical thinking
Page 95 and 96: time constraints, multiple versions
Page 97 and 98: they were required to examine. 173
Page 99 and 100: As Denning points out, these strate
Page 101 and 102: of thinking. For example, two video
Page 103 and 104: intelligence agencies. 191 This was
Page 105 and 106: thinking, however, by providing str
Page 107 and 108: Cooper’s Analytic Pathology Negle
Page 109 and 110: substantially better judgments abou
Page 111 and 112: item limit is easily extended: peop
Page 113 and 114: Finally, it may be a fallacy that c
Page 115 and 116:
partnerships between analysts and t
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1990s and 2000s Emergence of comple
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Conclusion Never before in our peac
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Appendix NSA’s Critical Thinking
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Administration: Enrollment: Up to 2
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against which to apply/illustrate w
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mindsets impact analysis. • Defin
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• Describe what is needed to move
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Class 4 - Causes, Squares, and Shru
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Class 6 - Testing the Devil’s and
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Class 8 - And Now for Something Com
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Class 10 - Final Project Presentati
Page 139 and 140:
Final Project Evaluation Worksheet
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Bibliography Ackerman, Robert K.
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Cheikes, Brant A., Mark J. Brown, P
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__________. Building Airplanes in F
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Grabo, Cynthia M. Anticipating Surp
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Kerbel, Josh. “Thinking Straight:
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Miller, Judith. “A Battle of Word
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Paul, Richard W., Linda Elder, and
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Stefik, Mark, and Barbara Stefik. B
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About the Author David T. Moore is
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