Critical Thinking and Intelligence Analysis

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typically work with…[and] occasional failures must be expected,” why should the Intelligence Community invest in teaching its analytic workforce to think critically 188 A brief review of the causes of failure clarifies the need for such an investment. Intelligence failures occur in both systematic and functional domains. Systematic intelligence failures occur when producers fail to notice phenomena and the consumers of intelligence fail to heed warnings or even to notice that they are being warned. It may be that both consumers and producers are focused on other issues at the time. Alternatively, intelligence-based warning is not taken seriously at high official levels. In cases where collaboration among intelligence agencies might be critical, key evidence may not be recognized and shared. All of these failings are illustrated in the “intelligence failure” to warn of the attacks of 11 September 2001 on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon near Washington, DC. In the first place, the policy issue that was at the forefront – according to press at the time – was a national missile defense system, not the likelihood of a terrorist attack on the United States. Richard Clarke, the Clinton and then Bush administrations’ terrorism “czar” observes that Bush administration officials were slow to recognize or consider the threats posed by Osama bin Laden. 189 Evidence passed by an FBI field agent about students learning to fly large aircraft with little regard for landing or takeoffs was not taken seriously at higher levels within the Bureau. 190 The Joint Congressional investigation into the attacks noted in its report that collaboration was lacking between agencies, especially between the law enforcement and strategic 188 Heuer, Psychology, 184. 189 “Clarke: Bush Didn’t see Terrorism as ‘Urgent,’” CNN.com, 19 May 2004, URL: , last accessed 9 March 2006. 190 Michael Elliott, “How the U.S. Missed the Clues,” CNN.com, 20 May 2002, URL: < http://archives.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/05/20/time. clues/index.html>, last accessed 9 March 2006. – 78 –
intelligence agencies. 191 This was both a cultural and a physical phenomenon. Airport security breaches during the summer of 2001 may have been related, but based on assessments of the catastrophe, were not connected to the events. 192 The same kinds of failings were identified by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in its assessment of the National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi WMD. As has already been observed, analysts and their managers were focused on the results and not the process. 193 Critical thinking can mitigate some common causes of failure and provide means by which they can be avoided in the future. Specifically, an intelligence process based on critical thinking offsets the following failures: Analysts are Wrong. It is unrealistic to expect that analysts can always be correct. Regardless of the processes they employ, analysts make errors and fail. Anthropologist Rob Johnston defines errors as “factual inaccuracies in analysis resulting from poor or missing data.” Conversely, intelligence failures are “systemic organizational surprise resulting from incorrect, missing, discarded, or inadequate hypotheses.” 194 Critical thinking mitigates these by providing means to assess errors in reasoning as they occur and before they become 191 U.S. Congress, Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, Report of the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and U.S. House Permanent Select Committee On Intelligence, Together with Additional Views, Senate Report No. 107–351/House Report. No. 107–792, 107th Congress, 2 nd Session, December 2002, xvi. 192 The author recalls that media reports of persons hopping over or otherwise improperly passing airport security checkpoints in and around Boston, New York, and Washington seemed to be higher than usual during the summer of 2001. 193 DNI Negroponte, in the National Intelligence Strategy of the United States (October 2005, 2) highlights the notion that the Community appropriately undertakes study of its internal processes, as well as of the quality of its products, by addressing both “enterprise” objectives as well as “mission” objectives. 194 Johnston, Analytic Culture, 6. – 79 –
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The National Defense Intelligence C
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Contents Figures and Tables........
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Figures and Tables Figure 1: A Comp
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As one would expect, the Intelligen
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quality by looking at the products
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Commentary Francis J. Hughes Profes
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That said, clever defense lawyers o
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Robert Heibel, Mercyhurst College;
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CRITICAL THINKING AND INTELLIGENCE
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CRITICAL THINKING AND INTELLIGENCE
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Figure 1 models analysts’ thinkin
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ecome better critical thinkers will
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- and consequences - things that do
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approach ensures that a topic or is
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Skill-Based Definitions Other appro
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A Disposition to Think Critically I
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The Role of Questions Greg Treverto
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problem solving and structured meth
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In fact, the Soviets were able to d
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It should be noted that the U.S. In
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thwarted What can be learned to adv
Page 51 and 52: Purpose · Determine what is going
Page 53 and 54: critical thinking could moderate th
Page 55 and 56: Cuba” that led to the tasking of
Page 57 and 58: A missile-launching complex is not
Page 59 and 60: (mapping), evaluate and adapt the i
Page 61 and 62: Winners and Losers: The Crisis in C
Page 63 and 64: as seen from Khrushchev’s Point o
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Page 73 and 74: was not enough. 117 Biases and mind
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Page 77 and 78: person, the analysis was faulty bec
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Page 81 and 82: to meet short deadlines. However, a
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Page 85 and 86: How can Analysts be Taught to Think
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Page 91 and 92: instructional models offer compleme
Page 93 and 94: Another means of critical thinking
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Page 99 and 100: As Denning points out, these strate
Page 101: of thinking. For example, two video
Page 105 and 106: thinking, however, by providing str
Page 107 and 108: Cooper’s Analytic Pathology Negle
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Page 113 and 114: Finally, it may be a fallacy that c
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Page 117 and 118: 1990s and 2000s Emergence of comple
Page 119 and 120: Conclusion Never before in our peac
Page 121 and 122: Appendix NSA’s Critical Thinking
Page 123 and 124: Administration: Enrollment: Up to 2
Page 125 and 126: against which to apply/illustrate w
Page 127 and 128: mindsets impact analysis. • Defin
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Page 131 and 132: Class 4 - Causes, Squares, and Shru
Page 133 and 134: Class 6 - Testing the Devil’s and
Page 135 and 136: Class 8 - And Now for Something Com
Page 137 and 138: Class 10 - Final Project Presentati
Page 139 and 140: Final Project Evaluation Worksheet
Page 141 and 142: Bibliography Ackerman, Robert K.
Page 143 and 144: Cheikes, Brant A., Mark J. Brown, P
Page 145 and 146: __________. Building Airplanes in F
Page 147 and 148: Grabo, Cynthia M. Anticipating Surp
Page 149 and 150: Kerbel, Josh. “Thinking Straight:
Page 151 and 152: Miller, Judith. “A Battle of Word
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Paul, Richard W., Linda Elder, and
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Stefik, Mark, and Barbara Stefik. B
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About the Author David T. Moore is
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