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Advisory Committee on Tax Exempt and Government Entities (ACT ...

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The Appropriate Role Of The Internal Revenue Service With Respect To <strong>Tax</strong>-<strong>Exempt</strong> Organizati<strong>on</strong> Good Governance Issuesthe organizati<strong>on</strong> to improve internal financial c<strong>on</strong>trols 170 <strong>and</strong> to make prompter <strong>and</strong>more comprehensive public disclosures, particularly with respect to financial reportingproblems. 171 Public company boards are required, am<strong>on</strong>g other things, to form an auditcommittee comprised wholly of independent directors to hire, supervise, <strong>and</strong> review theperformance of outside auditors <strong>and</strong> to disclose whether there is a financial expert <strong>on</strong>the audit committee. Public company executives must certify resp<strong>on</strong>sibility for financialreports; disclose material weaknesses; <strong>and</strong> assess the internal c<strong>on</strong>trols <strong>on</strong> financialreporting. Outside auditors are prohibited from providing most n<strong>on</strong>-audit services; leadauditors must rotate every five years, <strong>and</strong> the audit firm must report directly to the auditcommittee. The corporati<strong>on</strong> must adopt a code of c<strong>on</strong>duct applicable to its CEO <strong>and</strong>financial pers<strong>on</strong>nel <strong>and</strong> pers<strong>on</strong>al loans to executives <strong>and</strong> directors are prohibited.SOX also required the exchanges to implement certain changes in their rules. Perhapsbecause of the magnitude of the failures, the NYSE 172 <strong>and</strong> other exchanges went wellbey<strong>on</strong>d what was required <strong>and</strong> imposed l<strong>and</strong>mark governance reforms <strong>on</strong> theirmembers. For example, the NYSE requires that the boards of most publicly-tradedcompanies be comprised of a majority of independent directors, have audit,governance, <strong>and</strong> compensati<strong>on</strong> committees comprised solely of independent members,<strong>and</strong> undertake specified tasks, including c<strong>on</strong>ducting an annual self-evaluati<strong>on</strong>, that mustbe set forth in a charter that is posted <strong>on</strong> the corporati<strong>on</strong>’s website.Two questi<strong>on</strong>s then are: (1) what empirical data exists about the efficacy of thesevarious corporate “best practices;” <strong>and</strong> (2) assuming there is evidence of theireffectiveness in the for-profit world, will adopti<strong>on</strong> of those “best practices” by n<strong>on</strong>profitorganizati<strong>on</strong>s similarly achieve positive results.Professor Robert Clark, in a 2005 paper, 173 c<strong>on</strong>sidered the empirical studies involvingSOX-type governance measures <strong>and</strong> publicly-traded corporati<strong>on</strong>s then to date <strong>and</strong>c<strong>on</strong>cluded that “the search for str<strong>on</strong>g empirical evidence supporting a belief that keyitems in the recent wave of corporate governance changes will have a major positiveimpact is generally disappointing.” 174 For example:• Internal C<strong>on</strong>trols – Secti<strong>on</strong> 404. Regarding the internal c<strong>on</strong>trolsrequirements of secti<strong>on</strong> 404 of SOX, the analysis suggested that the benefitsof lower-level fraud detecti<strong>on</strong> are modest <strong>and</strong> he questi<strong>on</strong>ed whether theseinternal c<strong>on</strong>trol provisi<strong>on</strong>s would indeed prevent the high-level fraud seen in170Based <strong>on</strong> our experience <strong>and</strong> interviews for this report, public accountants representing both publicly-traded corporati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>and</strong>exempt organizati<strong>on</strong>s that the financial requirements of SOX, particularly involving internal c<strong>on</strong>trols, have impacted exemptorganizati<strong>on</strong>s; while exempt organizati<strong>on</strong>s are not expected to meet the strict requirements of secti<strong>on</strong> 404 of SOX, accountants aremuch more focused <strong>on</strong> their internal c<strong>on</strong>trols, including in management letters.171See, e.g., Oxholm, supra note 42, at 357.172The NYSE final governance rules enacted in resp<strong>on</strong>se to the corporate failures beginning with Enr<strong>on</strong> <strong>and</strong> the passage of SOXcan be found at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/finalcorpgovrules.pdf. Other NYSE rules <strong>and</strong> regulati<strong>on</strong>s can be found athttp://www.nyse.com/regulati<strong>on</strong>/rules/1145486472038.html.173See Clark, supra note 43.174Id. at 308.ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON TAX EXEMPT AND GOVERNMENT ENTITIES (<strong>ACT</strong>) June 11, 2008 81

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