Each nation entered the Cold War withdifferent strategic objectives. The UnitedStates recognised that it could neverreturn to semi-isolationism and thatcontaining the spread of Communismwas going to require global involvement.To back this commitment, the US had tocreate a naval force able to respondquickly to potential trouble spots. Such aforce would have to be self-contained andprovide for its own air defense.The Soviet Union took a much moredefensive stance. Its biggest concern waskeeping US warships out of Sovietwaters. While the United States built upits fleet of aircraft carriers, the Sovietsjumped ahead in missile technology. TheSoviets planned to make the vaunted USsuper-carriers vulnerable to low costmissile attacks.In the 1950s, the US Navy recognisedthat Soviet progress in missile technologywould one day pose a serious threat to itscarrier battlegroups. Naval tacticianscould envision having to fend off waves ofattacking long-range bombers or nuclearcruise missiles. It was assumed thatsometime within the next decade theSoviets would manage to arm theirstrategic bombers with stand-off cruisemissiles. Once this happened, UScarriers could be hunted down anddestroyed before they sailed withinstriking distance.To deal with this eventuality, the Navywanted to develop a carrier-based fighterable to engage Soviet bombers at rangesin excess of the stand-off range of theirmissiles. Engineers were quick to pointout that the Navy’s mission requirementswere at odds with the weight restrictionsnormally associated with carrier aircraft.A fighter conforming to this set ofrequirements, would have to be largeenough to store tons of additional fuel yetremain light enough for carrieroperations, an impossible task.The Navy’s answer was to design a fighterwith a powerful radar and complement oflong range air-to-air missiles. This solutionhad the advantage of increasing thecombat radius of the aircraft withoutincreasing its fuel load. The aircraft couldtake up a patrol station closer to thecarrier and let its missiles reach out andperform the mission. Unfortunately, thisconcept meant the fighter would beburdened by the weight of its own radarsystem and missiles, losing much of itsdogfighting capability in the process.The ability to dogfight was not supposedto matter. Under these designspecifications the aircraft would be aplatform for launching missiles, andnothing more. Once it had expended allits missiles it would immediately return tothe carrier. Labelled an interceptor, thisaircraft was never meant to engage theenemy up close and personal. After all,didn’t the Navy leave the guns off theirPhantom II design? They wouldn’t havedone that if they thought for a momentthat their pilots would be dogfighting withenemy pilots.GENESIS OF THE F-14In late 1957, the Navy won a contract tobegin developing the XAAM-M-10 Eagle,a two-stage, solid fuel, radar-guided airto-airmissile with a range in excess of100 nm. The Douglas F6D Missileer wasthe aircraft selected to carry the Eagle.The Missileer design called for theinclusion of a track-while-scan pulseA carrier battlegroup at sea.
Doppler radar with the ability to target,launch and control six Eagle missiles.This combination of aircraft and missilewas intended to perform the Fleet AirDefense role through the 1970s. Threeyears later, in late 1960, the entireprogram was scrapped. Enter theKennedy administration and a newSecretary of Defense Robert SMcNamara.McNamara was a business man, movingfrom a successful business career in theprivate sector to head up the DefenseDept. It was his contention that themilitary could save billions of dollars inprocurement by collective purchasing.That is, buying equipment in bulk. Insteadof allowing each branch of service to buydifferent items to do the same job,McNamara stressed commonality. Hewanted all the services to buy the exactsame items to contain costs, includingeverything from tools to tanks, frying pansto fighters.As it happens, both the Air Force andNavy were shopping around for a newfighter aircraft. The Navy was looking fora replacement for its cancelled Missileerwhile the Air Force wanted a high speed,tactical strike fighter (the TFX program) toreplace the aging F-105 Thunderchief.McNamara saw this as an opportunity tosave money. He wanted the defenseindustry to build a single aircraft to suitthe needs of both services.In 1962, after much prodding byMcNamara, the two services finallyarrived at a compromise design. GeneralDynamics was awarded the Air Force’sTFX contract. Grumman was given thecontract to begin work on the Navy’sversion of the same aircraft. Bothvariants, the Air Force’s F-111A and theNavy’s F-111B, were designed withmaximum commonality in mind.The first F-111Bs were flying by 1965.From the very beginning pilots hadserious reservations about McNamara’s“one fighter for all occasions” idea. Chiefamong the complaints was the aircraft’sweight, at 70,000 lbs., the aircraft was tooheavy to operate safely from an aircraftcarrier. Take-offs were risky, landingswere worse. Catapults and arrestorcables in service at the time were notstressed to handle this load. On finalapproach, the aircraft had to be flown atsuch a high angle of attack that the pilotcould no longer see the carrier deck.As a result of the F-111B set backs,Grumman proposed to rework the aircraftusing light weight titanium alloys. Thisreengineered design became known asthe VFX. In early 1967, the Navycommissioned a study comparing the twodesign proposals. Grumman’s VFXproject won hands down. Using the sameengines as the F-111B, the VFX turned ina consistently superior performance andCongress cancelled funds for the F-111Bin 1968.This cancellation proved to be the turningpoint in the F-14’s development. The waywas cleared for the Navy to make a RFP(Request for Proposals) outlining specificsfor a separate aircraft, apart from the AirForce’s F-111A. Some of the designfeatures mentioned were tandem seatingfor a two man crew, twin engines, a trackwhile-scanradar with multi-targetingcapability, and carrier suitability.THE F-14AGrumman was one of five aerospacecompanies which initially bid on the VFX(F-14) contract. Because of its pastassociation with the Navy and experiencewith swing-wing technology, it wasawarded the contract in 1969. Out ofhundreds of different designs, prototype303E was the one chosen for initial testproduction. The first of 12 developmentalaircraft was flying two years later (21December 1970). Operational F-14s weredelivered to the Navy (VF-1, VF-2) inOctober 1972. These two squadrons were
- Page 2 and 3: THEF-14TOMCATSIMULATIONDEFENDERGAME
- Page 4 and 5: TABLE OF CONTENTSAcknowledgementsSt
- Page 6 and 7: ACKNOWLEDGEMENTSAs you may have gue
- Page 8 and 9: over to the drive that contains the
- Page 10 and 11: INTRODUCTION
- Page 14 and 15: “Hey, buddy! Get the heck outta
- Page 16 and 17: Flying an F-14 requires a certain m
- Page 18 and 19: altitudes to wave-hopping dogfights
- Page 20 and 21: I. GETTINGSTARTED
- Page 22 and 23: air defense and escort missions. No
- Page 24 and 25: THE SCRAMBLE SCREENSCRAMBLE mission
- Page 26 and 27: THE CAMPAIGN STATUS SCREENAs the na
- Page 28 and 29: THE DIFFICULTY SCREENThe Difficulty
- Page 30 and 31: example, radar-guided missiles gene
- Page 32 and 33: Sound Off [S]This key is a toggle w
- Page 34 and 35: RESET [R]The RESET [R] Key takes yo
- Page 36 and 37: Position [P]Select your starting po
- Page 38 and 39: BEGIN button [B] Key. This takes yo
- Page 40 and 41: Regardless of the number of points
- Page 42 and 43: II. SIMULATIONCONTROLS
- Page 44 and 45: FLIGHT CONTROL KEYSPRIMARY FLIGHT C
- Page 46 and 47: ack seat). Consult the HSD and TIDs
- Page 48 and 49: Each time this key is pressed, the
- Page 50 and 51: Imagine the spectacular view this p
- Page 52 and 53: HARDWARE CONTROLSDue to the immedia
- Page 54 and 55: FCS-MARK II WCSBTN 4Wcs II Rocker S
- Page 56 and 57: FOOT PEDALSThe THRUSTMASTER RCS (Ru
- Page 58 and 59: The most intensely scrutinised port
- Page 60 and 61: Pilots often discuss the relative m
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and Angle of Attack are two differe
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himself). In normal flight the airc
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There’s no sense using all your f
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may as well return to the carrier g
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CARRIER OPERATIONSIn a way, FLEET D
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the Air Boss (F4 Key). Break even t
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up there, sooner or later you’ve
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Marshal PointsDaytimeApproachesA10
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Line up your general approach with
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ft. of altitudeLow Visibility Appro
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The LSO Wave-OffIf you fail to heed
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YOUR WING-MANAs if flying the F-14
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playing bumper cars or attempting t
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IV. F-14 COCKPITSAND AVIONICS
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PILOT (FRONT SEAT) COCKPITBecause y
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glide the aircraft down for perfect
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VERTICAL DISPLAY INDICATOR (VDI)The
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HeadingIndicatorThe Horizontal Situ
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MiG-23, MiG-25, Mirage F-14. Single
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ENGINE INSTRUMENT GROUPThe Engine I
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horizontal lines known as Acquisiti
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STANDARD MODE TACTICALINFORMATION D
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particular firing sequence, use the
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Note that Track mode is the abbrevi
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multiple targets are detected on th
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PDSTT only allows you to track ande
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your own is the one that is locked.
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Step 7: Perform an Identification,F
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indicated on the HUD, is reducedacc
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NORTH CAPE THEATRECAMPAIGN MAPS
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OCEANA TRAINING THEATRE