Manual

Doppler radar with the ability to target,launch and control six Eagle missiles.This combination of aircraft and missilewas intended to perform the Fleet AirDefense role through the 1970s. Threeyears later, in late 1960, the entireprogram was scrapped. Enter theKennedy administration and a newSecretary of Defense Robert SMcNamara.McNamara was a business man, movingfrom a successful business career in theprivate sector to head up the DefenseDept. It was his contention that themilitary could save billions of dollars inprocurement by collective purchasing.That is, buying equipment in bulk. Insteadof allowing each branch of service to buydifferent items to do the same job,McNamara stressed commonality. Hewanted all the services to buy the exactsame items to contain costs, includingeverything from tools to tanks, frying pansto fighters.As it happens, both the Air Force andNavy were shopping around for a newfighter aircraft. The Navy was looking fora replacement for its cancelled Missileerwhile the Air Force wanted a high speed,tactical strike fighter (the TFX program) toreplace the aging F-105 Thunderchief.McNamara saw this as an opportunity tosave money. He wanted the defenseindustry to build a single aircraft to suitthe needs of both services.In 1962, after much prodding byMcNamara, the two services finallyarrived at a compromise design. GeneralDynamics was awarded the Air Force’sTFX contract. Grumman was given thecontract to begin work on the Navy’sversion of the same aircraft. Bothvariants, the Air Force’s F-111A and theNavy’s F-111B, were designed withmaximum commonality in mind.The first F-111Bs were flying by 1965.From the very beginning pilots hadserious reservations about McNamara’s“one fighter for all occasions” idea. Chiefamong the complaints was the aircraft’sweight, at 70,000 lbs., the aircraft was tooheavy to operate safely from an aircraftcarrier. Take-offs were risky, landingswere worse. Catapults and arrestorcables in service at the time were notstressed to handle this load. On finalapproach, the aircraft had to be flown atsuch a high angle of attack that the pilotcould no longer see the carrier deck.As a result of the F-111B set backs,Grumman proposed to rework the aircraftusing light weight titanium alloys. Thisreengineered design became known asthe VFX. In early 1967, the Navycommissioned a study comparing the twodesign proposals. Grumman’s VFXproject won hands down. Using the sameengines as the F-111B, the VFX turned ina consistently superior performance andCongress cancelled funds for the F-111Bin 1968.This cancellation proved to be the turningpoint in the F-14’s development. The waywas cleared for the Navy to make a RFP(Request for Proposals) outlining specificsfor a separate aircraft, apart from the AirForce’s F-111A. Some of the designfeatures mentioned were tandem seatingfor a two man crew, twin engines, a trackwhile-scanradar with multi-targetingcapability, and carrier suitability.THE F-14AGrumman was one of five aerospacecompanies which initially bid on the VFX(F-14) contract. Because of its pastassociation with the Navy and experiencewith swing-wing technology, it wasawarded the contract in 1969. Out ofhundreds of different designs, prototype303E was the one chosen for initial testproduction. The first of 12 developmentalaircraft was flying two years later (21December 1970). Operational F-14s weredelivered to the Navy (VF-1, VF-2) inOctober 1972. These two squadrons were